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## FRANCE AND THE WAR.<sup>1</sup>

THE position of England in the war has been much discussed, although to the unbiassed onlooker it seems plain enough, no doubt because the matter has been clouded by reason of certain charges brought against England by Germany. England has become Germany's "dearest foe" in this war. As a result the place of France and the reasons for French participation in the war have remained under certain obscurities which, in justice to the French, should be cleared up.

It is remarkable, at the outset, that the Germans do not bring any charges against France, save the vague one—put forth officially late in the game—that France had intended to violate the neutrality of Belgium. They confess, on the contrary, that it was their own intention to crush France utterly in any case. On this showing, they admit that France was fully justified in resisting; and they admire the heroism with which she resisted. There is a good deal more in the subject of the place of France in the present war than this, however; and certain of the current presuppositions on the subject—current in the United States at least—are ill-founded. I wish to show this in what follows.

### I.

My principal object is to show that modern France, the France of the Third Republic, is not a military or martial country, in either of the two distinct senses, moral and political, of the term "militarism." It is said, by apologists for Germany, that France has a standing army larger in proportion to her population than Germany, and that the term of compulsory service is longer than in the former country. These facts present the outward signs of militarism, superficially understood. But they do not indicate either a military attitude toward life, a psychological and moral militarism, so to designate it, or an official military attitude toward other countries, a political militarism. They are to be explained as

1. An address prepared for a semi-popular English-speaking audience. Having lived in France the better part of each of the last six years, I have had unusual opportunities of observation by reason of the great hospitality shown me in scientific and literary circles. It is only fair to add, also, that my previous and more remote pre-judgments were, in many respects, favourable to Germany, because of my sojourn in Berlin and Leipzig as a student.—J. M. B.

issuing from two general causes and as reflecting two great facts in the life of Republican France—facts one of which the French have accepted until recently with resignation, and the other of which they are only now appreciating at its full worth. Both have become so prominent and ever-present to the minds of the people that they are fixed in special phrases—the “German menace” and the “Triple Entente.” In French opinion, from coachman to minister, from Royalist to Radical Socialist, the German menace had become, since the Tangier incident of 1905, a sort of datum of the emotional life, an assumption that needs no argument, an ever-present fact, like the danger of a cholera epidemic or the menace of a flood in the Seine. And the Triple Entente, the alliance with Russia, taken together with the understanding with England, has been considered, in all educated and well-informed circles, the available political weapon, the tool of diplomacy, the pledge of the preservation not only of the liberties of France, but of those of all Europe. It has ensured the superior power by which alone military aggression could be met. Before 1905, the date of the Tangier incident, neither of these facts had its true value in popular opinion. Although the German menace existed, it was not perceived in all its meaning save by certain prudent statesmen, like Delcassé, who were not, as so many of the politicians were, chasing the rainbows of international Socialism.

I wish to enlarge a little on these two things, especially the former, as explaining the moral and psychological tolerance extended in recent years to the military establishment, and justifying the political policies by which the Triple Entente was maintained and extended.

## II.

The German menace dates of course, in its present form—speaking as if before the present war broke out—from the war of 1870, after which France found herself in a position of humiliation. She had good reason to see, in the terms of the treaty of Frankfort, a threat of repeated aggression and possible extinction. During the early years of the Republic, however, the theories of the Jacobins were so “violently pacific,” and were to such an extent based on international tolerance and brotherhood, that the French lost their fear of German aggression and also much of their own proper patriotic feeling. The sense of security based on internationalism was aggravated by the success of the socialistic party in 1902, and by the subsequent radical development of theoretical democracy during the administration of Combes.

But the fear and the patriotic feeling were both revived by a series of unprovoked diplomatic and military provocations which seemed to the French to be due, on the one hand, to the German

appreciation of the national *insouciance*, and on the other hand, to German jealousy of the cultural successes of France.

During a series of years, the French met this policy of pin-pricks with a moderation, *sang-froid*, and dignity to which all the world testified on the occasion of the Agadir incident and during the entire Morocco imbroglio; the more striking in that this incident followed the Tangier affair and other events all calculated to excite suspicion and arouse resentment. Any one who cares to look up the files of the *Temps*, the *Débats*, the *Figaro*, during those anxious days of 1911, when the issues of war and peace were in the balance, will find evidence of this. Calm, resolute, as in the similar days of last July, the French press pointed out reasons for the aggression, finding in it only that spectre, the *menace allemande*, in a new form. There was no public excitement, none of the hysterical display that superficial British and American opinion sometimes associates with the French. Admiration of this fine moderation was publicly expressed at certain American functions held in Paris at the time. The French attitude was recognised as showing a certain stoical resolution, based on the anticipation, not then to be fully realised as it is so horribly now, of the inevitable war. Of the coming war there has been no doubt at all since the fall of Delcassé in 1905, a sacrifice to Germany. But in 1911 there was a sense of adequate preparation, as there had not been in 1905, a sense of the mastery of the vital and material resources of war which appears so nobly to-day in all the French people.

Soon after came the Zabern affair, followed by a remarkable series of pin-pricks to French susceptibilities as represented by their sympathy for the unfortunate people of Alsace. In certain villages, the populace had ventured to smile at the arrogance of the Prussian military authorities and some had even joked at the expense of the strutting German soldier. In the contest that ensued between the civil and military authorities, the latter were of course victorious: military personages found guilty by the civil courts of outrages against the populace, were freed by Berlin from all penal responsibility; and innocent citizens, suspected of French sympathies, were crushed by the imposing authority of the mailed fist. An officer found guilty of slashing a cripple with his sabre was given military justification, under cover of a nominal reproof. These petty tyrannies were accomplished by subterfuges which show that the methods now employed in Belgium are no new discovery. Had not the cripple shown himself guilty by trying to run away? Finally, the famous cartoonist and man of letters, Hansi, who ventured to portray the grotesque side of militarism in daily life, had to flee covertly from the country into France, to escape a sentence of imprisonment.

All this pettiness was met by the French with good humour,

but humour tinged with the melancholy of a deep-seated presentiment. The subtle irony seen in French publications of the year 1911-12 had a touch of bitterness and withal of disgust. What does it show? was the question asked in those days. The reply was—not Prussian conceit, coarseness, braggadocio only, but an underlying anti-French policy, a smouldering jealousy, an unsatiated appetite. French opinion, aroused before, was now shocked; its native chivalry was outraged. And more than this, its conviction of German animosity was confirmed. Are such things, they asked, as free speech, public criticism of officials, the rights of the press, suppressed in Alsace? Do the Germans themselves accept elsewhere such violations of the elementary rights of free citizenship? They were justified in thinking that even the Teutonic thoroughness was stretching itself a little in thus presenting to the gaze of the sensitive people across the border such a spectacle of the lost territory.

But the more essential fact was that the French were unable to put themselves in the shoes of the Germans, to think as the Germans thought. Their mentality was different, and the training they had received. Since the day of Gambetta, the French had been losing respect for the military point of view, which makes the soldier the centre of things temporal and eternal. They were busy working out their theories of democracy and the rights of man. They shrugged their shoulders in private at the German *cochons*, the people who dressed untidily, left their hands uncared for, trod on one's toes in summer hotels, talked constantly of the *nazionali* *Bewusstsein*, and displayed a sort of egoistic religious sentiment which flattered their national vanity (I speak as the Frenchman would). But they now found in this same Germanism something to be watched, something allied openly with force, something that authorized its apostles to preach conquest and world-dominance. This is what the French have found growing up in their minds these last years, becoming a nightmare as every evening paper was found to report some new sign of what they now call "bocherie." Since the war broke out, I have heard more than once the sentiment, "Thank God, now we know what is to be done." There is no longer the uncertainty, the hesitation, the dread; these have been replaced by the task, the duty.

What right, does one ask, had France to prepare to meet such a menace as this? The right of any nation to live, to cherish its national aspirations, to pursue its mission in peace. France found herself living in a fool's paradise, indulging in the socialistic dream of universal fraternity. There had even been a Germanophil movement—or at least a movement of imitation—in science, education, and letters, similar to that from which the United States

has been recently recovering. But when the ominous clouds appeared, French patriotism was reborn in a day.

That this was the state of the French mind at the outbreak of the present war, there are abundant external signs to show: for example, the character of recent French governments. France has had a socialistic government for years. The dominant coalition of parties has been professedly anti-military. Every increase in the budget for army or navy—increases which have been continuous since the Tangier incident—has had long and passionate discussion and has required overwhelming justification from the point of view of the national defence. Cabinet after cabinet has felt the drift toward disarmament, being obliged to pacify the pacifists, so to speak, in respect to the most moderate measures of military prudence. The Radical Socialists, led by Jean Jaurès, outspoken and persistent both in the Chamber and in their organs, *l'Humanité* and *La Guerre sociale*, have continued the tradition of Combism. Fortunately, the rising tide of nationalism has been more than a sufficient antidote.

The significance of all this is shown in the last great struggle of the kind, that which took place over the new law requiring three years of compulsory military service—the *loi de trois ans*.<sup>1</sup> The passage of this law, while not technically the cause of the fall of the Barthou Cabinet, was practically so, by reason of the sharpening and solidifying of the opposition which it brought about. Never in recent years—never since the Dreyfus affair let us say—has the Republic had a time of greater storm and stress than during the period of the discussion of this measure. Never was the policy of militarism as such more plainly and vigorously condemned; never were those of national defence and racial integrity more earnestly and forcefully advocated. Never was the German menace more eloquently, and withal more convincingly, presented to the people of France. The measure was passed in a great outburst of popular feeling. The government had staked its existence upon its passage, declaring it to be essential to the national safety. Here was the German menace taking on concrete numerical form; and it was such men as Barthou, Léon Bourgeois, Alexandre Ribot, Poincaré—economists, scholars, statesmen of diverse political creeds—who formulated the national sentiment; supported by a public press which was conducted with unusual ability and high patriotism. How the wisdom of these men was justified by the event!

In the subsequent cabinets, dominated by extreme Radicals,

1. The history of the laws regulating the term of service is itself significant. The term had been reduced by successive steps until it stood at two years. The return to military prudence and preparation was then reflected in this new law restoring the term of three years.

the law of three years has remained on the statute book. Its former enemies, although in power, have not dared to repeal it in the face of the national sentiment. Its wisdom was finally acknowledged by Doumerge and his fellow-ministers, Caillaux *et al.*, whether from patriotism or from party policy one may entertain a doubt. It had come into effective operation when the war-cloud burst; and its immediate effect was a considerable increase in the army, through the retention of the "class" of men who would otherwise have been released in 1914. Since the war began, socialists of the most radical type have declared their satisfaction that the law became effective in time. No doubt the martyred Jaurès would have joined in this view had he lived to see the course of events. In the present war cabinet, formed from all the political parties for the national defence, two portfolios are held by well-known militant socialists, Guesde and Sembat. In no party, moreover, is there any sign of disaffection in respect to the conduct of the war.<sup>1</sup>

So far then from indicating a military state of mind, in the nation at large, the will to be a great military power, the renewed warlike preparations of France in the last decade represent something very different—a growing apprehension, and with it a reaction against the loose unnational liberalism of the democratic *doctrinaires*. Such military precautions may have increased the danger of war; the increase of armaments usually does have such an effect. This was one of the arguments of Jaurès and others against the law of three years. The German Chancellor, in fact, made use of the passage of this law to support his demand for new military credits in Germany. But there is every reason to believe that this and the other military measures taken in France were in themselves motivated by considerations of national defence; it is certain, at any rate, they were received by the people in this sense.

Another motive of aggression attributed to the French is that of revenge—revenge for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Such a passion of revenge is constantly charged to them by what the French characterise as the clumsy indulgence of patronising enemies. The Germans find in this feeling a sufficient reason of all the French military measures. It is so generally taken for granted, indeed, as being a natural feeling, that the entire absence of it

1. The opinions of Guesde and Sembat on the war and the future of socialism are to be found in the newspapers of February 11 (see the *Figaro* of that date); they both gave out interviews outlining their attitude in respect to the proposed conference of socialists of the allied nations, held in London during the week of February 14. It is to be regretted that the same united front has not been presented by the English socialists, as may be gathered from the remonstrances addressed to Mr. Keir Hardie, and his associates of the Independent Labour Party, by Mr. Hyndman and by the Belgian leader Vandervelde (see recent issues of *l'Humanité*).

before the present war, a fact to which I can testify, is more than noteworthy. Never have I heard such a feeling expressed in any French circle; nor have I heard the topic of revenge discussed except in historical connections. The *revanche* of the Gambettists, and that of the special prophets of Alsace like Déroulède, were discussed with the ordinary French love of analysis and paradox, but not as being a living national purpose or motive. The feeling was really one of humane pity for the inhabitants of the lost provinces and the wish that at some future time they might be delivered. It was pro-Alsacian more than anti-German. So radically unmilitary have their ideals become under the Republican régime, that the French cannot conceive of happiness or contentment, in unfortunate Alsace, under the Prussian rule. Of course now, since the outbreak of war, the people talk of revenge and the literary men of retribution<sup>1</sup>; it is part of the new war spirit. But to speak of the French nation as having prepared its army and built its navy in order to wreak vengeance on Germany is nothing short of grotesque. The motive of revenge in such a form would conflict with the profoundest elements of the culture of modern France.

A quite different sentiment, entertained by the French people generally is everywhere in evidence—that which is directed against the religious chauvinism found associated with German militarism. This is to them a form of pretence, of religiosity, accompanied by a ridiculous inflation of personality. The Kaiser's frequent appeals to the Deity on terms of equality, and with the suggestion of a private *entente*<sup>2</sup> between himself and God, illustrate so well what is meant that the reader will have no difficulty in recognizing it. French writers find in this religiosity one of the prime factors of racial exclusiveness; to the onlooker it offers a real problem in the psychology of the military State. Looked at from the point of view of French liberalism, it proves the Germans to be at a tribal stage of political development and religious culture alike. Respectful to religion always, reverential now—as I am to show lower down—the unpolitical everyday Frenchman has no patience with the form of religion in which the Deity identifies his interest exclusively with those of a self-elected tribe or race, and issues to a "chosen people" a mandate to conquer and destroy. In Germany,

1. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities copies of the treaty of Frankfort were sold on the boulevards; and a play, entitled *L'Aube de la Revanche*, is now (Feb.) being produced in one of the Paris theatres.

2. An *entente*, however, which, *through no fault of the Kaiser's*, does not always produce the results desired. His Majesty is reported to have said to his troops (*Vossische Zeitung*, as quoted in the *Figaro*, February 17): "I hope with all my heart we shall be able to celebrate the sacred festival of Easter in peace and joy at our homes. I call upon God to witness that if this is not the case, it will not be my fault."

as all who have lived there know, this is not an accidental, local, or superficial thing. Taught in the schools and universities by means of state-edited text-books, enforced by church, press, and public opinion, equally under state supervision, it has been wrought into the national tissue. It is the justification, in theory and practice, not only of the Germany that now is, but of that which is to come—*Deutschland über Alles*. The "national destiny," gained by alliance with the Almighty, is the end that justifies the means. The Chancellor so declared in reference to the violation of the territory of Belgium. With this end goes the most varied means: the sword, the torch, the bomb, the mine, the diplomatic subterfuge. It restores the commission of Gideon who slew the enemies of Jehovah, and that of Elijah who destroyed the prophets and also the "high places"—the cathedrals, such as they were!—of Baal.

In contrast with this, the cosmopolitanism of French culture shows itself possessed of all the benign and pacific marks of true toleration. Call it free thought, if you will, call it enlightenment, attribute it to rationalism or to positivism or to socialism, its character remains the same. It shudders with horror at the invocation of a Deity who spreads his glory by the shedding of blood; and it cannot restrain the shrug of contempt for the devotee who makes himself the chosen instrument of such a Deity. Professor Boutroux has declared that a certain brutality is inherent in the nature of German national culture; we see here, perhaps, the reason for it. It finds its prototype in the relentlessness of the "destroying angel" of tradition—now taking form in the Uhlan, equipped in German casque and mail. No doubt there are many men inspired with the zeal of crusaders among the hosts that have invaded Belgium and France. I think the French feel that the great body of the German middle-class people look upon themselves and their nation as true crusaders, following a divinely commissioned Gideon; but they believe that these are directed in their mission by religious egoists and conscious hypocrites,<sup>1</sup> and the very severity of their judgment of the military class and of its resort to religious cant, shows how far removed the French point of view is from that of such a militarism.

1. This impression of hypocrisy is just now brought out in the comments upon the German war circular, "Appeal to the Christians of Protestant Churches of the French Language," addressed to "Foreign Protestants in Neutral and Hostile Countries," in which Germany makes herself champion of Protestant Christianity and Christian Missions as against England! One is constrained to ask: How about Catholic Austria, and Mohammedan Turkey? Signers of this manifesto, among them Eucken, Harnack, and Wundt, must know that similar appeals issued in the Orient describe the Kaiser as "His Islamic Majesty," who is to impose upon Europe the Mohammedan faith now espoused by him! The similar cultivation of the favour of the Vatican is left to Austria!

As to cosmopolitanism, the French value it as being the priceless pacific agency of life, the destroyer of racial prejudice, the begetter of sympathetic relationships among men. But they are coming to recognise that in the theory of internationalism there are the germs of national weakness, since in practice it destroys true patriotic feeling and produces symptoms of political palsy.

To one who has lived in both countries, Germany and France, the contrast between them is striking in the extreme; and both differ from the complacent but tolerant provincialism of the English. Not only in popular sentiment does the difference appear, but in the avowed purposes and policies of institutions and social organisations of all sorts. The Germans declaim against the use of French fashions, deplore the introduction of French words even on menu-cards, read lectures, in the press and by resolution of Germanic societies, to the Germans in America who give their sons and daughters un-German names, boycott music not made in Germany. I was once publicly reproved on a German liner, when at the captain's dinner given before landing, as the different national flags were taken in turn out of the cake in the centre of the table by admiring citizens, I rose, in the absence of any English passenger, and waved the Union Jack along with the Stars and Stripes. "There," said the officer in charge of the table, "is a man who does not love Germany—*der Deutschland nicht liebt*." Not that sort of Germany, certainly! In what other country would an order be possible forbidding all diplomatic agents of the government, in time of peace, to marry foreign wives?

In Paris there is none of this, little of it anywhere in France. In fact up to a recent date, true national sentiment has exposed itself to the risk of being called narrow and provincial. Recently the French waiters in Paris have complained of the overwhelming and unrestricted invasion of their trade by Germans, but without result. The complaint of the Parisian opera dancers, in view of the declining favour in which they were held beside the Russian and other foreign dancers, met only the reply that they must improve their performance and maintain the French superiority. Last year, toward the close of the musical year, a prominent daily paper said, in a spirit of banter: "Now that we have had a Russian season, and a Viennese season, and Italian and American seasons, there is nothing in the way of our hearing something French!" What Paris dressmaker would talk of excluding German or American models, and what French artist would wish to forbid the importation of German or Italian paintings or sculptures? The sort of national feeling that refuses hospitality to the best things, that fears competition with alien methods and ideas, that sets more store by the accidents of place and birth than by what is essential to the universal ideals of art

and of humanity—this is not French. If anyone doubt this, he may question any typical Frenchman of education as to his feelings on hearing of the destruction of architectural monuments at Louvain and Rheims; or, to get a wider answer, consult the editorial opinions of the French newspapers of the dates of these occurrences. He will find horror expressed and protest, it is true; but not merely national horror, not merely protest in the name of Belgian or French art. Rather will he be impressed by the sentiment of universal loss, of the outrage committed upon art as such, of the affront to human aspiration and the insult to the genius of the past. "Mon Dieu," says he, "c'est irréparable"—it cannot be replaced! While from Germany comes the sentiment, "What matters it, really? It is a pity, but we can make better ones!"<sup>1</sup>

None of the methods characteristic of a militant civilization, as we may call it, are tolerated among the French. They reject the idea that real culture can be imposed by requiring this or that mode of life or standard of taste, an idea which, in societies where it is current, betrays the reflection of military discipline into the moral life. How can free art, free science, free speech, live in an atmosphere in which the spontaneous activities of the individual, his impulses to live his life and express his opinions in the light of his conscience, are checked at every turn? In France, the wonderful development of the fine arts testifies to the absence of that mode of deference which refers all things to the over-lord, from the cut of the mustachios to the genuineness of an antique statue. In the third Republic the popular heroes have not been military men, but literary men—artists, dramatists, the laureates of the Academies, and the winners of the *prix de Rome*. The appearance of a new book by Anatole France or Paul Bourget has been a national event. The production of *Chantecler* and the activities and death of Gaston Calmette touched the Paris of the time as much as the successful sorties made by the troops in Morocco. Whatever this may have meant—and for some time it betrayed possibly a spirit too careless of the things of real national import, due to an ideology of liberalism rather than to a sound philosophy of society—it showed, without any doubt, that the military interest held no dominant place in the public mind. Just this state of things, indeed, has led to the under-estimation of the present strength, and also of the real patriotism, of the French in the minds of foreign critics who have not read the more recent signs of the times.

1. I quote the following from the report made to the German Government, by its expert, Professor Paul Clemen, on the destruction of Rheims Cathedral (cited by M. Dalimier, French Sub-Secretary of Fine Arts): "This extravagant worship of monuments is a strange sentimentality, an anachronism . . . at a time when our existence and the victory or decline of German thought (*Deutschen Denken*) are at stake."

Nowadays, while war is waging, the *tristesse*, the resigned patience of the people, is touching, pathetic. Theatrical performances, save of certain types, are forbidden; light music, gaiety in public places, modish dress, are not countenanced. Public sensibility revolts at the suggestion of lightness, in view of the usurpation of the resources of life by the fatalities of war. There is a moral *élan*, a desperate earnestness, a new hope, an enthusiasm for the cause; and these give the assurance of victory. But there is also the shock to the feelings of a high-minded people who look forward to a long struggle against the tendencies to debasement and materialisation of moral values which always follow war. "Alas, everything will have to be repaired," says a prominent writer. But over against this is the recognition of the new purpose, the spirit of self-mastery, of which I speak again just below. Remarking upon such an unimportant incident as the hissing, at one of the theatres, of an actress who danced the tango, M. Alfred Capus says, "Perhaps it will be one of the miracles of the war, under the favourable conditions of victory, to have reformed the public taste." I may cite in this connection two snatches of conversation—almost at random. Early in the war I asked an officer whether the French aviators would follow the German example of dropping bombs upon undefended cities. "Impossible," said he, "*nous ne sont pas des brutes!*" I remember well the look on the face of a society woman on hearing it said that the theatres in Berlin were patronised as usual: "How can they," she said; "do they not mourn for their dead?"

In another respect, France has shown herself for some years occupied with other things than armaments and military projects. I refer to the growth of a new idealism.

Last winter a well-known English writer, Mr. J. E. C. Bodley, published an essay on "The Decay of Idealism in France,"<sup>1</sup> from which he read extracts before the Academy of Moral Sciences. His point was, in effect, that the age of machinery, the mechanical age, had succeeded the age of idealism; and that in France, as everywhere, there had been a materialising of the spiritual life, a decline in the force of ideals. The French answer to this, repeated many times in my hearing, and formally expressed by different writers (among them M. G. R. Lévy, in the *Revue Bleue*) is always the same, as to the main point. The writers point out—as foreign observers, including myself, have done—that things have changed in the last decade. We have witnessed the commencement and positive growth of a new and fruitful idealism in France. It appears in practical life, in legislation, in public taste, in literature, philosophy, and religion. Practical signs of it are to be seen in the growth of stricter sentiments of personal and

1. A chapter in Mr. Bodley's book, *Cardinal Newman and Other Essays*.

social morality, of temperance, of the limits of individual liberty, of the requirements of social solidarity and collective responsibility. The widespread discussion, focussed in the Institute of France, of the alarming fall in the French birth-rate, has shown this new spirit of public concern and awakened conscience. The same may be said in respect to the question of alcoholism. The abolition of absinthe is probably only the beginning of constructive temperance legislation. As to other legislation, a large body of measures of direct practical import have been before the Chamber of Deputies, and many of the most important have been enacted: those on gambling and illegitimacy being of great importance as signs of the movement of opinion. In many other things to which the extreme *laissez faire* theory of liberty, on the one hand, and equally extreme anti-clericalism, on the other hand, had given the respectability of popular tradition, are now frankly criticised and condemned; among them, the extreme licence formerly accorded to theatrical performances.

In philosophy this new idealistic movement is taking the form, on the negative side, of a revolt from the positivism and naturalism of the late nineteenth century, and on the positive side, of a new intuitionism allied with spiritual mysticism. This latter, the spiritual, assumes positive religious form, filling the churches with worshippers, if not with converts, and modifying the public attitude in such important matters as laical education and the treatment of religious organizations. The change in the attitude of the press toward the Church in the last decade has been most noteworthy. An analogous change in public taste and in those purveyors to it, the writers of popular literature, shows itself in a note of moral severity and literary austerity. Since the outbreak of hostilities, articles have appeared in England and the United States suggesting that the war itself had served to produce in France a new devotion, a more united national purpose, a higher synthesis of spiritual values, a rebirth of the historical ideals of this great people; and there can be no doubt that the fact of such a change has been made plain by the war. What an exhibition of unity, restraint, persistence, chivalry, truthfulness, added to the ordinary military virtues of loyalty, bravery, heroism! And on what a background!—the usual canvas of war, painted over with figures which disgrace even the military life—brutality, licence, hate, deceit, piracy! How unspectacular, too, the French campaign has been. No blowing of bugles, waving of banners, or boasting of victories. And these are the people who, above all others, love the dramatic!

But although the war came at a good time to emphasise and crystallise these motives, it did not produce them. The future student of national culture will find abundant evidence to show that

the finest preparation for the war, the most convincing assurance of victory, lay not in the military equipment and armaments, not in the law of three years, not in the high financial credit of France, but in the moral purpose of the people, in their new view of life and duty. It lay in the national aspiration for a place in the brighter sun of world influence in literature, art, and morals, which was gathering force and already seeking instruments of expression, when the explosion of war startled it into self-consciousness. In a series of eloquent papers written before the war, M. Gabriel Hanotaux, formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs, himself one of the founders of French colonial policy, pointed out that in view of the apparent growth of German commercial interests in the Orient, it was France's true mission to reassert in Eastern countries her ancient conquests in the higher things of the mind.

### III.

So much for the psychological and moral side of our topic. Let us now look very briefly at the political side: the existence and rôle of the Triple Entente.

This is not a political paper; a political discussion in detail would require minute quotations from state papers and diplomatic utterances. I wish merely to point out that the existence of the Triple Entente had both its motive and its justification, so far as France was concerned, in the state of French opinion and feeling which I have described above.

The theory of the balance of power in Europe is expounded in many treatises on European politics. As long as one nation or combination of nations seems bent on aggression or territorial expansion, it is necessary that its power should be balanced by that of another combination of equal military strength. This was the *raison d'être* of the Franco-Russian alliance as negotiated by M. Delcassé. France was compelled to be ready to meet the German menace, which carried in it all the power of the triple alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy. It is generally believed that it was due to the acute diplomatic insight of King Edward, that England entered potentially into this coalition with France and Russia. It is admitted, with practically no dissenting voice, among international jurists, that the preservation of the European peace until now has been due to the creation of the balance between these two groups of allied powers. The utility of such a balance then is evident; nothing could replace it, as long as any one nation or coalition maintained armaments which threatened the security or existence of others. The only possible alternatives were disarmament, in whole or part, by common consent, or the establishment of some court of adjudication of international disputes to take the place of war.

In respect to both these directions—proposals for disarmament and suggestions looking to the judicial settlement of disputes by the development of the Hague Tribunal into a true international court of justice—France has positively shown her pacific intentions again and again.<sup>1</sup> Although taking a somewhat secondary place, on account of her alliance with Russia, France has almost uniformly supported the suggestions made by England and the United States, while in both the alternative directions mentioned, Germany has consistently and always found means to hinder progress or to block the way completely.<sup>2</sup> One of the late cases of this, outside the sphere of the Hague Tribunal, was the rejection of the proposal of the British Admiralty for a "naval holiday"—the cessation for a time of the building of battleships by the two countries. On certain occasions, when pacific suggestions failed of success, the utterances of German official personages have been of the most brutal frankness, extolling the sword as the arbiter of international differences, and war as the most effective means of argument. The Kaiser's "rattling of the sword," while the subject of humorous sarcasm across the ocean, has been serious enough on the continent, since it represented the colossal military machine now being used for the ends for which it was constructed. In France, on the contrary, there has been no war party, no pan-Franc campaign, corresponding to that of the pan-Germanists, no military bureaucracy, serving the diffusion of Jingoism; but a steady movement, led by men of the character of Baron d'Estournelle de Constant, in the direction of the establishment of international judicial institutions. The admirable efforts of Mr. Taft, while president, to negotiate treaties covering all possible subjects of dispute, were seconded by England and France, but rejected by Germany. It was reported that Germany gave a reluctant consent after the other treaties were prepared, but as a fact no treaty with Germany was presented to the American Senate. Even with the United States, Germany was unwilling to forgo the future right to resort to the sword.<sup>3</sup>

All these external political signs pointed in the same direction. They gave formidable body to the French fear of German aggres-

1. According to Mr. Andrew Carnegie, France had six cases before the Hague Tribunal, more than any other nation. The figures given by Mr. Carnegie are: France 6, England 5, the United States 3, Germany 3.

2. See the admirable brochure, *How Britain Strove for Peace: A Record of Anglo-German Negotiations, 1898-1914*, by Sir Edward Cook (Macmillan, 1914).

3. The suggestion made by the present writer, in an address before an American organisation in Paris, of an "All-Atlantic Alliance," a moral affirmation by England, France, and the United States in the sense of Mr Taft's treaties, was well received by prominent publicists. The treaties, as presented to the Senate, only to meet defeat, practically amounted to such an affirmation.

sion. They justified fully both the military preparation and the formation of the Triple Entente, considered as the means of preventing or checking such aggression. When the moment arrived and the pretext arose, it became evident that the voice of diplomacy, the cry of alarm of all Europe in the interests of millions of people, and the trumpet call of national honour, were together not to be sufficient to stay the fearful thing; it was to be after all the appeal to arms for which the nation trained in military science had always declared its preference. To France the menace turned in a day into the onrushing monster, and the Triple Entente showed itself the adequate defence provided by a wise and prudent foresight. For the attack took just the form that all the world had anticipated, a crushing blow at France. The first object of the war—the means to the ultimate end, if not that end itself—was the destruction of France; a means which doubled itself when this object required, as further means, the violation of Belgium.

Was ever a people better justified in the maintenance of an army and navy, in the deliberate adoption of the machinery of a military state, than twentieth-century France? What else could have prevailed against the German sword? It is written, "He that taketh the sword shall perish by the sword."

It is now plain, I think, that the German menace, taking on acute form in 1905, has meant to the French the imminent danger of war. Not desire for revenge, not military ambition, has finally led them into it; but the necessity of national defence, combined with a duty to the public right of Europe. To England the latter, the duty only, was urgent when the moment came; to France, both the duty and the necessity were immediate.

The attitude of the French people in this war is well summarised, in my opinion, in the following words spoken by a man now high in the counsels of State: "The war, to all good Frenchmen, a necessity to face, a duty to fulfil—but with what heaviness of heart (*dans le cœur du vrai français, quelle lourde tristesse!*)" M. Viviani, the Premier, closes his patriotic New Year's address to the Chamber of Deputies with these words:—

"If this contest is the most gigantic ever recorded in history, it is not because the people are hurling themselves into warfare to conquer territory, to win enlargement of material life, and economic and political advantages, but because they are struggling to determine the fate of the world. Nothing greater has ever appeared before the vision of man. That is the stake. It is greater than our lives. Let us continue then to have but one united spirit, and to-morrow, in the peace of victory, we will recall with pride these days of tragedy, for they will have made us more valorous and better men."

As to the future, no one can prophesy; we must await the course of events. A recent book, full of fine analysis and able criticism, *France Herself Again*,<sup>1</sup> by M. Ernest Dimnet, gives reasons for thinking that the factors of reform and vigour will dominate those of political disruption which, in his opinion, are the cause of most of the social complaints of the past. I believe his optimism is fully justified, the more because there are reasons for thinking that his indictment of the democratic régime, apart from the character of some of its politicians, is somewhat severe. M. Henri Bergson, commenting upon the recent excellent book of M. Charles Heyraud, *La France de demain*, pronounces this eloquent verdict<sup>2</sup>: "The difficulties which our theories laboured so painfully to resolve, have been overcome by action—the action in which France is just now engaged. The diseases which we ourselves discovered, and for which each of us proposed a remedy, have not lasted to be cured; they have been suppressed by the sheer uplift of our vitality. Internal dissensions, depopulation, alcoholism, what will remain of all this to-morrow if our *élan* be maintained? From now on France will be able to say, with one of her own great poets:—

'Le mal dont j'ai souffert s'est enfui comme un rêve.'"

JAS. MARK BALDWIN.

1. In this book, issued too late to be utilised in my paper, I find conclusions strikingly similar to those expressed here. I commend the book to English and American readers (Putnam, New York and London). A remarkable lecture, analysing the practical and moral effects of the war, has been published by M. Emile Boutroux, "*La Guerre et la Vie de Demain*," *Revue Bleue*, 16-23 January, 1915.

2. From M. Bergson's presidential address, December 12, 1914, before the *Académie des Sciences morales et politiques*.

AN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF  
THE WAR.<sup>1</sup>

FROM the time of Montesquieu there has been a general agreement among the best sociologists that the influence of the material environment decreases with the development of civilisation. While in the earlier stages, the environment, especially as it controls the prevailing forms of industry, shapes the general character and the main institutions of society, in later stages the prevailing determinant is the social *heritage*,<sup>2</sup> the accumulations of knowledge, skill, and wealth, the traditions and the ways of life handed on from previous generations. Of this an obvious instance is the retention by colonists of the chief characteristics of the mother country, as is seen among the Dutch on the South African veldt in an environment as far removed as possible physically and industrially from the moist climate, the intensive culture, the fisheries and commerce of Holland. In considering, therefore, the relations of the nations of Western Europe, we must consider them all as in various degrees the inheritors of the peculiar civilisation of the West, *modified* but never overborne by the special situation of each country. Therefore the first simplification that historical inquiry, within the bounds of Western civilisation, admits is to distinguish between the general development common to all nations and the particular circumstances which have led that general development to appear in each nation under somewhat different aspects, *i.e.*, to distinguish between the common mean of the whole and the deflections or the different rates of development of the various elements. It must, however, be remembered that each of these various nations not only shares the common heritage, and at the same time is affected by its particular environment, but also is stimulated or retarded by its contacts with the world outside and with its fellow-members, which as a consequence of their particular environments have followed a somewhat different line or have arrived at a different stage.

The main source of the social heritage of the nations of Western Europe is that earlier civilisation that grew up around the Mediterranean, and was carried beyond the Alps by the arms of Rome; and the first great distinction between these nations is derived from the completeness with which that conquest was carried out: whether in fact the barbarians found—as in Gaul, Spain or Italy—a completely Romanised province, on whose institutions and way of life their own was merely superimposed, or whether, as in

1. A paper read before the Sociological Society, March 9, 1915.

2. I use the word "heritage" for social transmission, keeping "inheritance" for biological or racial transmission.

Britain, they entered a province already abandoned by the Romans, or, as in North Germany, there existed a people that had never suffered the Roman yoke. As against this difference, there were other forces in the mediæval world tending to restore unity. The extension of Charlemagne's empire, the conquest of England by the Normans, who had already accepted the language and civilisation of Gaul, brought to the conquered much that had come from ancient Rome; and England and a great part of Germany had already by adhesion to the Catholic Church come under the influence of an institution which combined the three strands of theocratic tradition, Greek philosophy, and Roman organisation. Moreover, all the nations of the West had a common task, for all had, though in different measure, to protect Western civilisation from those outside it and gradually to extend its borders. The Western world in the middle ages had attained a unity which it afterwards lost and has not yet regained. Doubtless, that unity depended on a very insufficient and temporary basis. The idea of Christendom sprang from a religious unity which has not been preserved. The common ways of life depended on feudal institutions fitted well enough for defence against the barbarians, but unsuited either to offensive war or growing industry. The contact of East and West, of Moslem and Crusader, the new intellectual life that began to stir in Europe, undermined the complete domination of the Church over European thought and morals. The growing weakness of the spiritual power opened the way for the increasing strength of the temporal authorities and the rise of the great centralised monarchies. The renaissance of ancient learning still further weakened Catholic morality and the Catholic view of life; and if the Renaissance brought to men's minds the glories of the pagan past, so the discovery of America foreshadowed that the future was to be greater still. The world was confronted with new problems political, intellectual, and industrial to which the learning, the devotion, the piety of the middle ages afforded no answer. Finally, there came the Reformation, as it is called, and the Church that had so long been a bond of union broke violently asunder. Christendom became a mere name. The nations stood forth as the highest social units, crossed for a time by the international leagues of Protestant and Catholic. Eventually, as the religious wars came to an end and sectarian animosities died down, patriotism for a time became—not only a great virtue—but the highest of the social virtues. The very tradition of anything greater than the country, the nation, became dim. I shall trace later on the growth of new forces under which a larger patriotism, a devotion that should surpass the bounds of country again became possible.

These movements to which I have referred were all general to the whole West. The Reformation, the least general of all, was

found in germ in all countries, and even in those which adhered to the Catholic Church the public mind was profoundly modified. The Church of the counter-reformation, while it claimed to have maintained its doctrinal unity with the Church of the middle ages, was much altered in tone and temper. It even produced a Catholic Puritanism which for a time shut up the theatres of Madrid half a century before the theatres of London under our Puritans shared a similar fate. But the various nations experienced the effects of these movements differently, both in degree and in time. The general movement was modified by the particular environment. Let us consider, as perhaps the most interesting case at the present juncture, how these changes affected Germany, for the fundamental cause of the present crisis is the existence among the great European nations of a retrograde Power, organised for war. That country shared with Spain the task of fighting to defend the borders of Christendom, long after England and France had ceased to have any part in such work, save in the general and distant expeditions of the Crusades. But there was this difference between Spain and Germany that while the Spaniards were fighting against an enemy in many respects equal, and in some, superior, to themselves in civilisation—for the Arab University of Cordova was long a centre of light to Moslem and infidel alike—the German had as his neighbours wilder Slavonic and Tartar races, not merely outside of Western civilisation, but at that time distinctly inferior to it. Further, when once the Moor was expelled from Europe, Spain obtained a definite frontier, the Eastern frontier of Germany always remained indeterminate. Compared then with Spain, and still more with France, Germany, which had inherited to a much smaller extent the results of the ancient civilisation of the Mediterranean world, found her available energies much more occupied with the defence of her frontiers against the barbarians. There was a secondary influence acting in the same direction. The aspirations of her rulers to be the successors of the Emperors of Rome led them to aim rather at extending their power in Italy than at consolidating it at home. Hence, there came about a phenomenon often noted by historians that while German feudalism went through the same stages as feudalism in France, each change took place some centuries later. When the time came for the consolidation of France into a great centralised monarchy, Germany was still split up into numerous principalities; and the Reformation under which some of these became Protestant and others remained Catholic did not make subsequent unity more easy.

In fact, as Germany emerged from feudalism, she received a double set-back, one due to a loss of commercial importance, the other to the religious wars. The first she suffered as a result of distant events. The products of the East, brought from the Levant

to the Italian ports, reached the north of Europe in large measure through Germany. It was a source of great wealth, which she lost when the old trade routes to the East were closed by the Turks. With the discovery of the Cape route to India, the nations on the Western sea-board gained at the expense of Italy and Germany, while they monopolised the trade with the New World.

Much less obvious is the explanation of Germany's share in the Reformation. If that was a great advance, it is difficult to understand why it began in a part of Europe relatively backward. Nor is it easier for those to explain it who consider it a retrograde movement, a breach in that Catholic unity which it had taken so many ages to build up; for it is certain that there was both a more fervent and a more implicit belief in Christianity in Saxony than in Rome, where in the time of Luther the Renaissance was in full force. The Reformers did not profess to take a step forward to new truth, but to return to the pure doctrine and practice of the primitive Church, as they imagined it to have been, and such questions had ceased to have a paramount interest for the Italian world. There are really two problems involved. Why did the Reformation occur when it did; why did it begin in Germany? The Reformation occurred at the time it did because the new forces intellectual, moral, and social had escaped from the control of the Church. Confronted by new and difficult problems, its discipline had decayed and its power weakened. The Reformation began in Germany rather than elsewhere for many reasons of varying importance: (1) because Germany was less Romanised than the other nations of the West; (2) because while the intelligence of the country was sufficiently advanced for the study of great issues, theological issues were still regarded as more important than science and the ancient learning which were occupying the minds of Italy; (3) because there was an economic advantage in stopping the drain of wealth to Rome; Germany had been called the milch-cow of the Papacy; and (4) because the German princes coveted the possessions of the Church. Some of these conditions were found in many other countries, but in none did all work together and encounter so little opposition from other circumstances. For instance, in those countries where there was a centralised monarchy, the greed of the nobles was checked—permanently in France, for a time in Scotland—by the fears of the monarch and the interests of the monarchy. In England, the crown was strong enough to take the possessions, and to some extent the authority, of the Church for itself.

The effect of the Reformation was: (1) to separate Germany from the general life of Europe—though as other countries became Protestant, this in time ceased to be so important; (2) to divide the country itself—adding to the many political divisions a great cross-

division between the two religions, following roughly the boundaries of the Roman Empire, the South and West being in the main Catholic, the East and North Protestant, with a preponderance of the free cities on the Protestant side; (3) to produce the terrible thirty years war, which again put Germany behind the rest of Europe. The Congress of the Nations at Munster by which that was ended, was a great triumph for international law and the commonwealth of nations. It was the starting point of European unity in the political world. But it put further off than ever the unity of Germany; for the compromise, now finally confirmed, by which each German Prince was to regulate the religious conditions of his own principality, strengthened the position of these sovereigns and increased the diversity even between neighbouring states.

This Peace of Westphalia marks decisively the abandonment of the old unity of Christendom as it had existed throughout the middle ages and the rise of new bonds of unity. What were these bonds? Science unifying men's thoughts, common results reached by the same methods in all nations; art, more subject to national tradition, and yet a universal heritage and a common inspiration; commerce and industry joining the nations by mutual advantage; and following these, the growth of the ideal of duties above those due by the citizen to his country, the recognition of the comity of civilised nations, and eventually of the unity of all mankind. But it was shown decisively that that unity was not to be brought about by conquest at the hands of one Power, as Rome had brought about the unity of the Mediterranean world. Thrice has that been attempted since the Peace of Westphalia, and in each case the other nations have combined to check it. What the persevering industry of Louis XIV, and the genius for war and organisation of Napoleon failed to accomplish, will not, we may be sure, come about as the result of that war which even, as I speak, is claiming its tale of death in France and Poland.

There have been two opposite methods proposed for bringing about the unity of our Western world, each of which receives little support from the experience of the last three centuries. The first, to which I have already alluded, is the forcible union by one conquering nation. Every attempt of that kind provokes, sooner or later, a union of all the other powers. The modern conqueror has not, like ancient Rome, to meet communities still organised as city states, or barbarians in a lower stage of civilisation. The common civilisation of the West, while it makes for unity, is at the same time a barrier against the imperial pretensions of any one member. There are some, however, who propose to bring about this unity by the abolition of all national distinctions, by recognis-

ing no claims save the claims of all mankind, and no citizenship save the citizenship of the world. It is an enticing mirage which, unlike schemes of universal conquest, appeals especially to those of wide sympathies, but it breaks on the impregnable rock of fact—the great fact of nationality. The nations of Europe, where each nation has its long tradition of glory and suffering, of great deeds accomplished and good work done, where the general life is closely entwined with the life of each individual citizen from youth to age, cannot be obliterated; nor would it be wise to obliterate national distinctions if we could. The richness of our Western civilisation depends on the harmonious blending of different elements; and each nation brings to the service of Humanity those special qualities which result from its past training and its present resources. Patriotism can never be blotted out. If it is to change its character in the future, it is by each nation bringing its special qualities to the general good—instead of trying to impose on others its own type of civilisation as the only one worthy to survive. What would the world have lost if, to take but one instance, the clear thought and intellectual courage of France had been overwhelmed in some common mean? The unity of the future must arise from the comity of nations, working not against but through the national consciousness of each. Without stretching the comparison between society and that very different organism, the human body, we must have in the former as in the latter a unity arising from the harmonious working of various organs.

Now as a national organism Germany is in a different position from the other nations of Europe. If we except Italy the other nations may be divided into two, or perhaps three, classes: (1) Those like France, England, Spain, Portugal, Holland, which have behind them a long past in which, whether weak or powerful, they have lived their own life and developed in their own way; (2) those like Ireland and Poland which, dominated by more powerful neighbours, have through long ages struggled to keep alive their national life under the domination of their conquerors; (3) Those aggregates, nations in the making which without any long national tradition, are being welded into national unity and consciousness by their corporate life and common fortune. Of these perhaps the most signal instance is Belgium. Italy and Germany form a class apart. From very early times the Italian and the German were distinguished from their neighbours. In numbers and in service they have for centuries taken their place among the great peoples of the West; but they failed to achieve political unity till our own time. In both countries the memory of the long ages of political impotence has led their new rulers to aim at military power. But the Italian people are, as a result of their whole history, of their country's ancient civilisation and geographical

position, essentially pacific. In Germany, the iron has entered into the people's soul.

The situation of Germany, as it existed in the eighteenth century, might seem in some respects especially favourable to a recognition therein of European unity. Its political decentralisation rendered all dreams of universal conquest impossible. It had no colonial empire to distract it from the interests of Europe. Compared with the narrow politics of each German state, the intellectual life of the whole country seemed vastly important. But the Germans of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century who rose to the ideal of human unity, did so without transcending the ideal of country, for politically they had no country. The French preachers of human unity in the same period, Diderot, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Comte, arose in a nation long powerful, united, and assured of its own place in human history; they separated the dross of vulgar ambition from the pure gold of human service, and taking their own national position for granted, they advanced from the love of France to the love of all mankind. They had no need to ask if their duty to their country conflicted with their duty to Humanity, for assured of the national independence and unity, they found the true greatness of their country in their country's service to mankind. The ideals of the Revolution and of Bonaparte, of light and darkness, might clash, but those who took their stand on the great principle of human fraternity had no need to ask themselves if their fidelity to that principle was treason to France. It was only after 1870 that doubts began to arise; and never in her long history has anything been more creditable than the way in which those doubts were met. Through all these years she has remained, even by the admission of her present enemies, essentially pacific and humanitarian, not seeking war, and yet when war was forced upon her, shrinking from no sacrifice, and bearing all its sufferings with unflinching fortitude.

Now let us consider the position of Germany. As we saw she passed through the successive phases of feudalism long after the nations further West. She failed to attain unity when they attained it; and as a consequence she was for many ages insulted and ravaged by her more powerful neighbours. It is true that—some centuries after England and France—she gained a great place in the world of thought and letters; but that perhaps served to make her political humiliation the more apparent and the more galling. Some, indeed, of her greatest sons were prepared to bow to the tyranny of Napoleon, but the war of liberation awoke new hopes. While other nations were passing beyond a narrow patriotism, and were founding on the national unity the hope of the brotherhood of the nations, Germany was engaged in the task of transforming her old political organisation into one which should

enable her to take her place as a great world-power. It was a task that required all the resources, material and intellectual, of the people. It could only be brought about by successful war. It therefore meant the acceptance of the leadership of Prussia, the most military among the German states, and the organisation of the State for military ends, supported by a scientific and industrial development, such as had never been at the disposal of the great conquering nations of the past. The very forces which in the history of the modern world have relegated war to a secondary place, here were subordinated to its service. The result was extraordinarily successful. The country practically attained its unity in a few years. It passed to the first place among military powers. It organised the life of its people for its chosen end with unequalled efficiency. But it did so by making that one aim paramount.

Students of the historians and philosophers of modern Germany find in their teaching the root of the evil; and it is at least true that a nation whose intellectual life is free, alert, and receptive of outside influences, may triumph over political disabilities, even as France did in the eighteenth century. But this teaching has been the product of, as well as the incentive to, the present political attitude of the German people. Many streams have gone to fill the swollen river of German *Kultur*. As a consequence of its late emergence from the middle ages, remnants of feudalism still linger in the supremacy of the Junkers, and the subservience of large masses of the people—a supremacy and a subservience which are reflected in the opposing notion of the class-war. From the course of the Reformation and the compromise of the peace of Westphalia, the Protestant Church has been subservient to princes and magistrates in a way unexampled in Western Europe. In this island the subordination of Church to State has been carried very far in the past, but who can imagine in the nineteenth century the Kirk of Scotland and the Anglican Church, or indeed any two separate religious communions, submitting to amalgamation by royal decree in the same way that the King of Prussia united the Lutherans and the Calvinists in his dominions. Worse still, the universities, which much more than the churches constitute the real spiritual power of the country, are completely under state control; and their professors give a willing—a zealous service. In the industrial field, not only does the great industrial expansion render possible the support of the military machine, but the military machine by its training, and by the method of recruitment, disciplines the workers and strengthens their subordination. What a power is given to the industrial chiefs when they can decide in practice the age at which and for what time their subordinates have to serve in the army. So, too, the various social schemes to benefit the

workers all make for regimentation and subordination. Political, intellectual, and industrial influences all converge to the creation of a Germany organised for war.

Nor are there any corrective influences that could stay the process. There can be no union of intellectual forces for emancipation where philosophy and science start from different principles and pursue different methods to different ends; but there can be a united support of the action of the state where the leaders of thought are not dispersed among the general population, but regimented in state-supported universities. There is nothing in the old metaphysical philosophy of Germany, without a scientific and therefore an international basis, which could withstand the influence of the political and social environment. Nor can science serve the purpose of emancipation unless it takes large general views. Still less can the meticulous learning for which Germany has long been famous. Nor in the political field is more aid to be found. German socialism is itself a magnificent regimentation. Idealistic liberalism, so strong in 1848, is discredited by its failures. On the other hand, judged by the tests of national unity, wealth, and power, the present régime has been a great success. Its weakness is that it lives on the reputation of a past era. Will the coming failure of the successors of the men of 1870 awake their nation to more beneficent purposes and larger ideals?

I have already compared Germany with her Western neighbour. On the East there is another great nation, which attained to civilisation even later than Germany. If Germany may be said to have received the results of the old Mediterranean civilisation at second hand, Russia may be described as receiving them at third hand, save so far as they were conveyed to her in some small measure by the channel of the Greek Church—an institution throughout its history tending to make the State theocratic and the Church subservient. The Germans speak of the Russians as barbarians. In a sense it is true, and yet in Russian society there is a primitive spontaneity and a sense of human brotherhood which atone for much barbarity. It has been the boast of Prussia that she is a barrier against these Eastern barbarians. As a matter of historic fact, she protected Europe, if such was her duty, only by betraying it. She was on most occasions the friend and ally of Russia, till the rise of Pan-Germanism made her the protector of Austria, her semi-German neighbour. Then the conflicting ambitions of Austria and Russia in the Near East ranged Russia and Germany on opposite sides in two great leagues of nations. But this division of Europe had an earlier origin. When at the close of the Franco-Prussian war, Alsace and part of Lorraine were annexed to Germany, it became inevitable that Europe would be divided. France was utterly defeated by the Allies in 1814 and

1815, but the old territory of France was left intact. There was no cause for lasting estrangement between victors and vanquished. In 1871 a different course was taken. France was dismembered. A population which—though in part originally Germanic—had long been French in national sentiment, was annexed to Germany against its will; and the conquerors took little pains to reconcile their unwilling subjects. A permanent source of enmity between France and Germany was thus created, and the nucleus of the division of Europe into two hostile camps, two opposing systems of alliances, was established. Of this enmity, the new Empire, proud of its own strength and contemptuous of its defeated rival, had little fear. That enmity only became dangerous when, having taken Austria as her dependent ally, Germany crossed the path of Russia in the Balkans.

Meanwhile, her growing power, her expanding trade, awakened a new ambition in Germany. Far back when she was still weak and divided, the more westerly nations had spread themselves over the world. Spain, Portugal, and England had reproduced their civilisation in new communities beyond the sea. England and Holland had gained large empires in the tropics. Germany, belated in this as in more vital matters, had been in no position to take part in the scramble. To the great men who achieved the unity of their country, the absence of colonies and sea-power seemed of little importance. Bismarck apparently was glad that France should weaken herself in Europe by devoting her energies to the extension of her empire in Africa. It may be that he recognised how great would be the antagonism to a nation strong at once on sea and land. The sea-power of England has been acquiesced in grudgingly enough, and only because she never aimed at domination on the European continent; when she has fought there her allies have contributed a far greater quota to the armies of the alliance. Colonies were not wanted for Germany's emigrants; for, owing to the industrial development at home, the tide of emigration began to slacken about the time that her new sea policy began; and the lands best suited for settlement were already occupied by civilised and for the most part self-governing communities. Moreover, her coast-line is small in proportion to her size, and thus ill-fitted to supply a great navy. In itself, the desire of Germany to be a great naval power may seem one to which no other power had a right to object. Practically, it meant that strong at sea and all-powerful on land, Germany was aiming at a predominance which neither Louis XIV nor Bonaparte had ever held.

The way to Germany's ambition both by sea and land lay through Belgium—a country she was pledged to defend. A somewhat idle controversy has grown up as to whether England's

interference in the war should be justified by the breach of Belgium's neutrality, or by the desirability of averting the predominance of a retrograde Power organised for war; and the advocates of the latter view ask if any treaty can be eternal. But the violation of Belgium neutrality—no ordinary breach of a treaty, but the commission by Germany of the very wrong against which she had promised to defend her weaker neighbour—the shepherd turned wolf—is itself the most flagrant symptom of the disease of Prussianism, with its double evil, its steadfast organisation of the whole nation for war and its exaltation of that one nation over the consensus of nations, of the national will over international law, of the interests of one people over the interests of the whole human race. The West has long tended towards a comity of nations, forming a whole, loosely joined by many common traditions and interests, and in which no one Power predominates. Circumstances have made Germany more backward than its neighbours in its general development. By a great concentrated effort she has at last attained unity and safety; and on that success she has built the hope of predominance by a devotion to militarism perhaps impossible to countries in a more advanced stage of civilisation. In resisting German aggression the other nations are endeavouring to keep Europe to its old lines of development; their action will be justified in so far as it revives the free consensus of the nations of the West, and the recognition that each nation is but an element of a larger whole.

S. H. SWINNY.

## THE HAGUE COURT:

ITS CONSTITUTION AND POTENTIALITIES.<sup>1</sup>

To speak on the Hague Court at a time when war is raging among the Powers of the Earth and law and order are being defied as hardly ever since the middle ages, may seem at first sight like mere trifling. In reality it is nothing of the kind. From the date of the creation of the Hague Court in 1899 to now, I have never ceased pointing out that neither it nor arbitration in the ordinary sense of the word could be regarded as capable of serving as a substitute for war in all cases. I mention this once more to prevent any misunderstanding as to the nature and objects of this paper. All I propose to do is to explain why the Court exists, its constitution and procedure, what it has already done, what it is capable of doing, and the reforms which have been suggested to give greater scope and effect to its work, a work quite useful enough to justify confidence in its future without expecting from it realization of any of the dreams of a millennium in which some of its more ardent apologists have indulged.

## I.—ORIGIN OF THE COURT, ITS CONSTITUTION AND PROCEDURE.

The Hague Court owes its origin to the Peace Conference of 1899, but to understand its true nature and objects we must go back to an earlier period in the history of International Arbitration. International Arbitration means simply the reference of disputes between independent States to Arbitrators chosen by the parties themselves. It is this voluntary and agreed selection of the judges that distinguishes Arbitration from adjudication in disputes in ordinary Courts of Justice. Arbitration is no new thing in the settlement of disputes between nations, as anybody can ascertain for himself from Dr. Evans Darby's valuable collection of the different schemes which have been propounded and the different cases which have been decided by this method of adjustment. All these cases, however, down to the great one about which I shall speak presently, had been decided by an Arbitrator or Arbitrators without regard to any particular procedure and without any attempt to assimilate the forms of any national judicature. There was no question of deciding international differences as differences between individuals are decided in our Law Courts. It was due to the statesmen of the two great Anglo-Saxon communities that the first attempt was made to deal with international differences of the deepest gravity in accordance with the forms of national justice. Few among the audience to-day may remember what is known as the Alabama case; I am among those few. I well

1. A paper read before the Sociological Society, March 23, 1915.

remember the furious controversy which accompanied every stage in the development of the question of its settlement. In spite of the violent opposition of excited patriots the two Governments signed a Treaty at Washington in 1871 referring the Alabama and several smaller analogous cases to the decision of Arbitrators. The Alabama was a vessel built in British waters for use as a war vessel in the service of the Southern Confederates during the great American Civil War. That the vessel was being built for this purpose was notorious, and the attention of the British Government was called to this fact by the United States minister in London. The vessel was, nevertheless, allowed to sail and at the Azores she was equipped for active service in the then pending war.

For the first time in the history of Arbitration a system which has now become almost common practice was adopted. The Court was constituted of three foreign Arbitrators, viz., Count Sclopis, an Italian, M. Stoempfli, a Swiss, and Baron D'Itajuta, a Brazilian. Lord Chief Justice Cockburn sat on the Court on behalf of Great Britain, and Charles Francis Adams on behalf of the United States. Count Sclopis presided. This Tribunal met at Geneva in 1871, and after sitting for nine months delivered an award condemning the British Government to pay a sum of, in round figures, three and a quarter million pounds, as an indemnity for the damage done in particular by the Alabama in the capture of Northern or Federal ships for the benefit of their ultimately defeated adversaries, the Southern or Confederate States. The result eventually came to be regarded as highly satisfactory, and excited patriots were obliged to admit that high as the indemnity was, it was an infinitely better solution than submitting the question to the arbitrament of brute force; and we cannot at the present day but rejoice that the Government had the foresight to resist the combative instincts of those who regarded our acceptance of a peaceable settlement as the abdication of England's proud independence and an acceptance of foreign dictation in a matter governed by no then existing rules of international practice. So true is it that there were at that time no such rules that the Treaty of Washington had to lay down certain principles of law which were stated in the treaty not to be of general acceptance but only to have been adopted for the purpose of the case in question. These principles, however, in spite of the British reservation, have become the law of civilized nations, and are now incorporated as such in one of the Hague Conventions. The precedent of the Geneva Court, however, remained a solitary exception among the numerous arbitrations which followed it for thirty years.

Meanwhile, in both England and the United States, the idea that arbitration might some day become a standing international institution never ceased to occupy the minds of pacific reformers.

It became almost a commonplace to advocate the principle of arbitration in every case of international difficulty, and in 1895 Lord Alverstone, at a meeting of the International Law Association at Brussels, stated that "arbitration was now regarded as so fully recognized by all civilized nations that it had become unnecessary to argue in its support." Schemes of procedure were drawn up by different international bodies, and towards the close of the last century men began to talk seriously about general and standing treaties of arbitration and the possibility of a permanent Court for its application without that ironical under-current which until then had marked the expression of the practical man's feelings towards arbitration. It had, in fact, been made slightly ridiculous by the exaggerated hopes expressed by some of its more injudicious advocates. At length the idea of a standing treaty of arbitration struck the highly practical mind of the late Lord Salisbury as feasible, at any rate, between the United States and ourselves, and in 1896 he was personally directing negotiations for this purpose with the Department of State at Washington. The negotiations resulted, in 1897, in the signing of such a treaty for five years. I cannot help thinking that the principles of that treaty were full of wisdom. It did not attempt to do the impossible but only to meet different contingencies which could arise between two nations in the way best adapted to avoid national susceptibilities.

There were to be three classes of arbitration tribunals. For questions of indemnity up to £100,000, three arbitrators were to be necessary. When more than that sum was in dispute, five arbitrators were to be called in. For territorial or national questions of supreme importance the number of arbitrators was increased to six. In case of the arbitrators finding it impossible to form the required majorities, a friendly Power was to be called in to mediate. The chief clauses in the Treaty were Article VI and Article VII. Article VI was as follows:—

"Any controversy which shall involve the determination of territorial claims shall be submitted to a tribunal composed of six members, three of whom shall be Judges of the British Supreme Court of Judicature, or members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, to be nominated by Her Britannic Majesty, and the other of whom shall be Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, or Justices of the Circuit Courts, to be nominated by the President of the United States, whose award by a majority of not less than five to one shall be final. In case of an award made by less than the prescribed majority, the award shall also be final, unless either Power shall, within three months after the award has been reported, protest that the same is erroneous, in which case the award shall be of no validity. In the event of an award made by less than the prescribed majority and protested

as above provided, or if the members of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be equally divided, there shall be no recourse to hostile measures of any description until the mediation of one or more friendly Powers has been invited by one or both of the high contracting parties."

Article VII provided for decision by a tribunal similarly composed of all questions "of principle of grave general importance affecting the national rights" of either State, "as distinguished from the private rights whereof it is merely the international representative."

The essential point in this project was that for these questions of supreme national importance the arbitrators were to belong exclusively to the two contracting States. The idea which had prevailed until then in the constituting of Courts of Arbitration was that the arbitrator or umpire, if more than one, was necessarily a person who, by his independence and entire detachment from the interests involved, had the requisite impartiality for the pure and simple application of principles of justice. It was thought that nations could only apply as between themselves the same principles as regulate litigation between citizens. And indeed the assimilation is reasonable and perfectly practicable for questions of indemnity, which constitute the majority of international differences.

The use of the word "arbitration" in connection with this proposed mode of dealing with such vital issues is therefore to some extent misleading. The Court provided for in Art. VI of that treaty is called an "Arbitral Tribunal." In reality it is a "Joint Commission." This Joint Commission, then, was instituted to meet the difficulty of bringing grave national issues within the operation of the Arbitration Treaty in question. The draftsmen of the Treaty of 1897 knew that no Great Powers would dare to leave the decision of any vital issues between them to the hazard of any independent judgment, however great and unquestioned the impartiality of the judge. It has always been felt that such issues could never be committed to the decision of foreign arbitrators, or of a foreign umpire, an umpire being, for obvious reasons, necessarily a foreigner. The negotiators, therefore, provided that there should be neither outside arbitrators nor any umpire at all. Furthermore, to allay fears that any great national interest might be exposed to quixotic or unpractical views taken by any single judge, it was provided that, to be binding, the decision should require the concurrence against it of two out of three of the judges appointed by either party. This precluded, by a simple and practical method, for both countries, any danger of decisions contrary to the national feeling. The object of the two Governments was, manifestly, not so much to create a substitute

for war, as to provide a further stage of negotiation, and thus enable Governments to issue from any deadlock, into which they might have been drawn in the heat of controversy or by pressure of public opinion.

They consequently limited their efforts to the creation without the introduction of any third or independent element, of an automatic system, calculated to remove questions between the two States from irritating discussion by irresponsible politicians who can seldom be sufficiently conversant with the facts to deal efficiently with them. They hoped thereby to arrest the development of those vague hatreds, created by prejudice and ignorance, which grow no one knows how, and soon break away from their initial cause. Unfortunately this Anglo-American Treaty was not adopted by the United States Senate, although there was a majority of sixteen in its favour, owing to the fact that the United States Constitution requires a two-thirds majority for the adoption of a treaty. There were 42 votes for and 26 against it. Four more votes would have sufficed to ratify it.

At length came the Czar's famous rescript of 1898. Count Muravieff, his Foreign Minister, included among the subjects for discussion the establishment of a uniform practice in reference to good offices, mediation and facultative arbitration, but the proposal of a Court of Arbitration once more came from the representatives of the two Anglo-Saxon communities. It was more particularly, in fact, Lord Pauncefoot, the British Delegate, who had signed the Anglo-American Treaty when British Ambassador at Washington two years before, to whom the proposal of the Permanent Court was due.

## II.—EARLY DISTRUST AND ITS EVENTUAL CESSATION.

There is something colossal in the very idea of a permanent Court of Justice for the decision of differences between States. One thinks of the graduation of our national Courts, of how our judicial organization provides an ever higher rank and greater function, as it ascends from rung to rung in the hierarchy, and yet the highest rung only deals with very small matters compared with the immense interests involved in the decision of an international issue. Our sense of proportion asks where we should find the judges great enough to inspire awe and confidence in the mighty litigants who are to sheathe their swords and humbly submit their differences to this highest jurisdiction of mankind.

We must therefore not be surprised if States shrank from making recourse to the new Court compulsory. In fact they repudiated the idea of compulsion in every provision of the Convention of 1899, and much to the disappointment of many of the more ardent votaries of arbitration, it contains specific warnings of

its purely optional nature. Thus the signatory Powers undertake, in case of grave disagreement or conflict, before appealing to arms, "as far as circumstances allow," to have recourse to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers, and, "as far as circumstances allow," the Powers may tender their good offices, and the exercise of this right can never be considered as an unfriendly act. Provision is made "as far as circumstances allow," and where involving "neither national honour nor vital interests," for international commissions of inquiry which are to have no binding character for the parties. Lastly is constituted the Permanent Court of Arbitration to which all questions may be submitted, which it has not been possible to settle by diplomacy, but everything again of an obligatory character in connection with it is most carefully eliminated.

The rules relating to the procedure of arbitration had already been drawn up and, as the Convention on the subject states, the object of the Permanent Court was to facilitate immediate recourse to arbitration for international differences which it had not been possible to settle by diplomacy. This Permanent Court of Arbitration was to be at all times accessible and to operate, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, in accordance with the rules of procedure inserted in the Convention. The Conference, it is seen, left it to the Powers themselves to organize the Permanent Court, but it made a suggestion of what might be the composition of the Court failing direct agreement of the parties, viz. : that each party should appoint two arbitrators and that these together should choose an umpire.

It was also agreed that each signatory Power should select four persons of known competency in questions of international law and of the highest moral reputation to form a panel of members of the Court from which the Arbitrators could be selected. The panel was duly created, but for some time it seemed as if the Court was destined to remain a mere pious wish, if not an ironical demonstration of the absurdity of "pacifism," a term invented by the adversaries of pacific methods generally. For three years no recourse was had to the new institution. To the English judicial mind in particular it merely appeared as a sort of concession of the practical man to popular sentiment, even perhaps to popular ignorance which it would be safe to ignore. At length the United States and Mexico, less susceptible to the ridicule of the ignorant, gave it its first case, and the two great republics of North and Central America determined to cross the Atlantic and in the home of Grotius submit a difference between them to the new Court. As Baron Descamps, the eminent Belgian Senator and ex-Minister, who argued the case of the United States before the Court, said : "they gave a lesson to the old world."

The lesson had its effect. It was *le premier pas qui coûte*, and since then the Hague Court has had many cases. I do not say that they have all been cases which would not have been settled by arbitration without the existence of the Hague Court, but I do say that the existence of this Court has facilitated recourse to arbitration, that irritating discussion preliminary to the adoption of its procedure has been avoided, and that it has had a suggestive influence generally which has relieved states from any need of public justification of recourse to its peaceful agency. Its utilisation, moreover, may be the means, as we shall see, of proceeding further in the development of arbitration by the broadening of the area of its jurisdiction, so to speak, and by the adaptation of its methods to the varying requirements of international controversies.

International Law is not backed up with a police force to carry out its fiats. It depends for its observance upon the reasonableness of its rules. Diplomacy, the chief agency by which, in time of peace, International Law is applied, on the other hand, like the procedure of our domestic courts of justice, is largely a congeries of devices which have grown up to provide for requirements shown to exist, owing to the inherent intellectual shortcomings of the men who resort to law or even of those who have to apply it. In our domestic courts we distrust leaving irrevocable decisions to the judgment of one man: we distrust decreeing finality either to arguments or to evidence. And, to a great extent, circumstances have also led in diplomacy to the employment of many different forms to enable Governments in a similar way to avoid the calamity of deadlocks. Yet deadlocks do occur, and in recent times we have been more than once brought to the verge of war with powerful neighbours by practical deadlocks. Our diplomatic machinery, in spite of its arsenal of forms, failed for want of a further jurisdiction, which, by operation of law, without further discussion, should become necessarily possessed of the question at issue. We cannot disregard the natural weaknesses of mankind in the relations of nations with one another. Patriotism, ignorance, "bluff," improvidence, thoughtlessness, courage, love of excitement, conceit, conviction (right or wrong), misunderstanding, exaggeration, all affect the course of international questions, when public opinion is appealed to or allowed to take any part in their decision. This is the danger, and it is on account of this danger that so many great statesmen are agreed that, successful as our diplomacy usually is and admirably as it is recruited, we can no longer rely, in the circumstances of the present age—with a vigilant and enterprising press ruthlessly day by day dissecting every international incident, and a nervous, overstrained democracy which, especially in overcrowded cities, claims its say in all public matters—we can no longer, I say, rely on the quiet settlement of difficulties,

which the accredited diplomatists have not solved, without the aid of some further dilatory amicable procedure by which Governments can at least gain time.

Whatever difference of opinion may exist as to the mode in which arbitration can be best adapted to cover such and all cases of international difficulty, we have the great, if only, precedent of a general Arbitration Treaty between great Powers, the unratified Anglo-American Treaty of 1897. It cannot be denied that that treaty is based on a reasonable view of the difficulties which beset arbitration in the minds of statesmen, where national questions of vital importance are involved. It embodies, at any rate, as President Cleveland said of it, a "practical working plan" for bringing these delicate matters within a general treaty. On the other hand, the Hague Convention has dealt with all matters but this very class, which was excluded from the purview of the Conference, and as regards all others but this class, reference to the Hague Court is fast being made compulsory. Then what is wanted, to complete the work done at the Hague, is to graft upon it some such provisions as those contained in the Anglo-American Treaty, confining the choice of the arbitrators, where the question is of vital importance, to persons exclusively of the nationality of the States concerned.

### III.—COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND THE SCOPE OF ITS APPLICATION.

I have dealt with the first two great landmarks in the history of systematic arbitration, that is arbitration as a judicial method of adjusting international differences. The first was the Anglo-American Alabama arbitration at Geneva in which the forms and procedure of law courts were followed. The second was the constitution of a permanent court of arbitration at the Hague modelled more or less upon the principles of the Geneva arbitration court. I come now to the third great step in the story—the first standing treaty of arbitration, under which two great Powers determined to submit all differences of a judicial character to the decision of this court. That treaty was signed by Lord Lansdowne, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, on October 14, 1903, after an agitation lasting three years in which I had the honour of playing the part of leader, a treaty for ever memorable because it was the first of the series of agreements which consolidated the Entente between this country and France. This Anglo-French treaty provided as follows:—

*Article I.* Differences of a judicial order, or relating to the interpretation of existing Treaties between the two Contracting Parties, which may arise, and which it may not have been possible to settle by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the

Permanent Court of Arbitration, established by the Convention of July 29th, 1899, at the Hague, on condition, however, that neither the vital interests, nor the independence or honour of the two Contracting States, nor the interests of any State other than the two contracting States, are involved.

*Article II.* In each particular case the High Contracting Parties, before addressing themselves to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, shall sign a special undertaking [in French—*compromis*] determining clearly the subject of dispute, the extent of the arbitral powers, and the periods to be observed in the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, and the procedure.

The terms of agreement as adopted by Great Britain and France became a sort of common form, and in the course of a few years there were but a few states in the world which had not concluded with each other similar treaties. The Hague Court, in fact, was now universally recognized as an international institution with a definite function, and the self-dubbed "practical man" ceased to regard it as a mere concession to popular prejudice and ignorance.

To understand, however, the full bearing of the Anglo-French treaty I must ask you to revert again to the Hague Conference of 1899, and remind you of a fact which has probably been forgotten by most people by this time. It was that the Russian original project of a general treaty of arbitration provided that it should be obligatory. The then famous Article 10 of that project provided as follows:—

From the ratification of the present Act by all the signatory powers, arbitration is obligatory in the following cases, in so far as they do not affect either vital interests or the national honour of the contracting states:

1. In cases of difficulty or contention relating to pecuniary damage suffered by a state or its citizens, in consequence of illegal acts or negligence of another state or its citizens.

2. In cases of difference relating to the interpretation or application of the treaties or conventions herein mentioned.

- (a) Treaties and conventions relating to posts and telegraphs, railways, protection of submarine cables; prevention of collisions on the high seas; navigation of international rivers and inter-oceanic canals.

- (b) Conventions relating to copyright and industrial property (patents, trade marks, etc.); to money and weights and measures; to sanitary and veterinary matters and the phylloxera.

- (c) Conventions relating to successions, cartel and mutual judicial assistance.

- (d) Conventions relating to boundaries, in so far as of a purely technical and non-political character.

To the first class in this enumeration some exception was taken, but the conference was practically agreed on the general principle of the article—viz., that the signatories should oblige themselves to refer to arbitration all matters not involving a vital interest or the national honour. After recasting the Russian project to meet different objections of detail, the idea of making reference to arbitration obligatory, even on these minor matters, had to be abandoned. One Power alone, but a very great Power, refused to agree to obligatory arbitration in any case whatsoever. That Power was Germany, who "did not consider that she could enter into any treaty binding herself beforehand to submit new cases to arbitration."

At the time it seemed as if this opposition on the part of a leading state on an essential point would make the whole work of the conference in reference to arbitration a mockery, and there was general disappointment, not confined to those who had hoped that, though the Russian Emperor's original idea of disarmament had not found favour with any of the chief participants in the conference, at any rate some sort of obligatory arbitration would be adopted which would largely compensate for its rejection. Obligatory arbitration, in fact, had become for many the chief object of the conference, and it seemed to them as if without it no headway in the cause of peace would have been made at all. When the conference came to an end the stormy petrels of the press and magazines were jubilant at this apparent failure of the conference to do anything but put in the form of an agreement the rules already practised. They pointed out with derision that the objection raised to the obligatory character of Art. 10 had been translated into every article of the Convention. Every step forward was attended by a step backward by the addition of the proviso: "as far as circumstances allow." This had been the price of Germany's adhesion to the Peace Convention. Well, nevertheless, one of the earliest treaties based on the formula of the Anglo-French treaty was one between Great Britain and Germany.

The effect of this new Anglo-German agreement was that Germany thereby withdrew her opposition, so far at any rate as regarded Great Britain. This was a point of considerable significance. Germany appeared to have changed her attitude towards standing treaties of arbitration, and had now become by the new treaty an active party to the promotion of the prestige of the Hague Court. There could be little doubt that thenceforward the statesmen of the Western nations intended to treat the Hague Court seriously and, with a recognized Court to

apply it, there was no longer anything utopian in the idea of a code of international law. But we see the still more important fact of general application, viz., that by the adoption of the permanent court of arbitration and by the obligatory reference to it, through the conclusion of numerous treaties, of all the very cases which were proposed in the furthest-going scheme submitted at the first Hague Conference, the then "wildest" of schemes had now become the "mildest" of commonplaces. For all cases of a judicial character the Hague Court had become as much the appropriate jurisdiction as any national court for similar cases. We heard no more about the futility of a Court which had no means of enforcing its decisions. Universal public opinion afforded the necessary sanction. Although as many as thirteen cases have now been decided by the court, and two at the outbreak of the war were still pending, and the powers which have submitted differences to it number seventeen, including some states which have even been regarded as unruly,<sup>1</sup> not a single instance has occurred of a state showing even the slightest disrespect for the decision given.

We must, however, remember a point which is often overlooked. It is that the parallel in national justice to an international court of arbitration is a civil not a criminal court, and that the complaints of critics of arbitration assume that the advocates of arbitration propose to give powers of punishment to a jurisdiction which is essentially a court for the decision of points of law and the assessment of damage. Whether we are likely ever to reach a stage in which such a court can deal with any but questions of judicial right is the next point we shall have to examine.

#### IV.—"VITAL INTERESTS" AND MORAL POTENTIALITIES.

You will have observed that the Anglo-French treaty contained the proviso that it should not apply to questions involving vital interests, the independence or the honour of either state. This was the class of questions which in the Anglo-American treaty corresponded to questions of "grave general importance affecting the national rights" reserved for a joint commission as distinguished from a court of arbitration. This exclusion of the very matters which seem the only kind capable of inflaming public opinion to a dangerous point shows the limit to which in both America and Europe statesmen are prepared to go so far as arbitration is concerned. What is a vital interest?

"Vital," I venture to suggest, means some difficulty which can

1. The States which have agreed to references are as follows: Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, the United States of America, Japan, Mexico, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, Peru, Venezuela.

only be solved by reversion to the *status quô ante* or the reversal pure and simple of the act committed. If, for instance, the English port authorities had declined in time of peace to allow a French man of war to leave Gibraltar until a case arising out of a collision were tried, France would probably have refused to submit the question of the detention to arbitration, but might have agreed to the determination by arbitration of the liability of the vessel and assessment of the damages. The freedom of movement of her vessels of war she would have considered as a vital interest, the other as a difference of a judicial order. We may understand what is a vital interest from this example.

The determination of what is a question involving "national honour" is less easy. An insult to an ambassador or to the national flag may be regarded as examples. Though an indemnity may be paid by way of damages, it is obvious that no state would willingly agree to an arbitration in which it might be competent to the tribunal to declare that no damages were payable or would allow a third party alone to assess the payment which would repair an insult. It is only where there may be a doubt whether a certain act is an insult or not that conceivably arbitration would be accepted by a state which felt some doubt itself. On the other hand the over-heated discussion of any question or the difficulty of receding from an erroneous or one-sided view of a question may be regarded as involving a national honour conspicuously absent in most such cases from the controversy. In short the Hague Court is for the trial of civil causes—a court which can have no punitive character, which decides between the judicial rights of the litigant parties, and which can only deal with precise points submitted to it or assess the amount of damages payable when required to do so in the protocol of reference signed by the parties.

It has been proposed by the United States Government that the court should be assimilated even in its composition to a national court, that judges as in the case of national judicatures be appointed and sit in rotation, and that a special selection of arbitrators *ad hoc* should become unnecessary. An exhaustive scheme was submitted by the American delegates at the conference of 1907 for the purpose of creating this "Court of Arbitral Justice." Out of the panel forming the court three judges were to be selected to form a special delegation, and three more to replace them if the former were unable to act. They were to meet in session once a year on the third Wednesday in June, the session to last until all the business on the agenda had been transacted. The difficulty of an annual selection by all the powers involved might no doubt be overcome and probably the scheme of the United States with some minor modifications will some day bring the court into a closer harmony with existing judicial systems.

What then are the potentialities of the Hague Court? Since it came into existence in 1899 there have been six wars—the South African, the Russo-Japanese, the Turco-Italian, the Turco-Balkan, the Inter-Balkan, and the present gigantic conflict. In none of these cases has there been matter for arbitration. They have all been wars of conquest, deliberately undertaken with a view to conquest. In the Turco-Italian and the present war no time was left after the declaration of war for any mediation which might have led to arbitration, if there had been, in either, any arbitrable matter. In the Inter-Balkan war the hostilities broke out without even a declaration of war. In the Turco-Balkan war even the disguise of a grievance was dispensed with, and in the South African war in which grievances were alleged and there was time for arbitration, it was firmly declined.

It is obvious that where one of the parties is decidedly in the wrong, he will not agree to arbitration. We may therefore eliminate from among the potentialities of the Hague Court all recourse to it where one of the parties to the difference has an unavowed object or an avowed object which according to the principles of justice would have to be condemned. In the Turco-Italian war, Italy frankly admitted that her object was to occupy and annex the Tripolitana and Cyrenaica. Had the matter been submitted to arbitration she could but have been declared in the wrong. If, in the present war, Germany had agreed to arbitration she could not have hoped to obtain by an award either any part of Belgium or of the Baltic provinces of Russia. If England had agreed to arbitration with the Boer Republics the question of a South and East-African dominion would have passed out of realization and the Republics, with the assistance of Germany, would have finally blocked the road between Egypt and the Cape.

Then it is evident that arbitration, in none of these cases of war since the Hague Court was instituted, could have saved the states in question from war. The rôle of the Hague Court, therefore, is just that which it has played since its creation. It is a court for the determination of cases in which there are disputed questions of right and damages, questions in which rules of law and justice are applicable, and in which the parties seek in good faith an honest solution.

And yet there are powers which might be given to it, even in cases like the present terrible war, in which the bulk of the nations of the earth are engaged in a life or death struggle while only the weaker nations are neutral. It might sit as a sort of court for grievances before which all alleged violations of international treaties or usages might be laid; by which all cases of futile cruelty might be judicially examined. It might not only condemn such violations of law and humanity but it might offer recommendations

and help to prevent the growth of illegality which marks the progress of the present war.

It may be a dream but I wonder whether, some day, out of the Hague Court and its further developments, some institution may not be evolved in which men of different nations may be elected by civilized mankind to possess in common the citizenship of all nations and relinquish patriotism or political attachment to any one of them, an institution entitled to express its opinions and give its advice with all the sanctity of the oracles of antiquity. Or perhaps a special state may, some day, be created like the District of Columbia, created to fulfil the purpose of securing independence among the United States of Europe, or it might be a special college of jurists having an existence as independent as the Vatican. In any case some such body of "supermen" who have nothing to gain and nothing to lose might come to wield a power over the minds of mankind not unlike that at present wielded by the Holy Father at Rome or by the Caliph over Mahommedans. It may be a mere dream, as I say. Certain it is, however, that the world needs some great moral force to guide and uphold it amid the ambitions of sovereigns and statesmen, to protect men against their own cruel and rapacious instincts and to set a higher tone of human sympathy and fraternity among mankind generally.

THOMAS BARCLAY.

## GERMANY AND AMERICAN OPINION.

PROFESSOR ALBION SMALL TO PROFESSOR GEORG SIMMEL.

For the following communication, addressed by a representative American sociologist to a German sociologist no less representative, we are indebted to Professor Charles A. Ellwood, of the University of Missouri, who writes: It may be of interest to the members of the Sociological Society to know the trend of academic opinion in the United States, and especially of American sociologists, regarding the present war. I have tried to keep in close touch with this matter, and I think it safe to say that nine out of ten American academic men in responsible positions are non-sympathetic with Germany in this war, in spite of the systematic campaign which German professors have undertaken to influence the opinions of their American colleagues, and in spite of the traditional influence of German over American universities. The enclosed copy of a letter from Professor Albion W. Small, of the University of Chicago, to Professor Georg Simmel, of the University of Strassburg, well illustrates the attitude of those Americans who have been most friendly to German scholarship. As your readers know, Dr. Small is editor of the *American Journal of Sociology*, is a leader of sociological thought in America, and was for two years president of the American Sociological Society. He has always been a protagonist of German scholarship in the social sciences, and is closely related by family ties to the German people. His letter was written in reply to one of Dr. Simmel's claiming that "all the world is believing lies about Germany."

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,  
October 29, 1914.

Professor Dr. Georg Simmel, Strassburg.

My dear colleague and friend,—

A message from you is always welcome, but I share most genuinely with you the pain of the occasion which gives rise to any conferring at all upon the subject which is uppermost in my mind, as it is in yours. Indeed, I have postponed my reply from day to day because I felt unequal to the delicate problem of conveying on paper precisely my own reaction, which so far as I can discover is substantially that of nine out of every ten academic men in the United States. There are certain things which must be emphasized: first of all, that in a mere measuring of sympathy with the various peoples of Europe, apart from any judgment upon specific issues in controversy between them, American academic sentiment for the past thirty years, and to-day as emphatically as ever, is overwhelmingly in favour of the Germans. We do not express

ourselves in the German way. We do not pronounce German civilization as a whole superior to other civilizations. We think that is repeating in varied form our own naive blunder in the formative days of our nation, viz., for nearly a hundred years it was the almost unchallenged American formula that our Constitution is not only the best possible for ourselves at the given moment, but that it is the only government fit for progressive human beings anywhere. We have changed our minds about that. So we try to restrain ourselves from violations of courtesy when we encounter, face to face, German expressions of the German estimate that German culture is superior to that of the rest of the world. We think—or at least the Americans who know the Germans best think, and say very freely—that the Germans are particularly strong in traits which we conspicuously lack, and that Americans would be a nobler people than they are if we could reinforce American life with a liberal infusion of German superiorities.

In the second place, it would be a great mistake for Germans to suppose that Americans are relatively misinformed about the great outstanding facts in the European situation. On the contrary, it has been evident from the second day of August that, as compared with the other nations of the world, the Americans are posted up to date. I heard Professor Kühnemann say this with emphasis to a large audience of Germans a week ago. He confessed that he was astonished on arriving here to find out how much more fully informed the Americans are than any of the Europeans about what has actually occurred. The main reason for this is obvious. Not being at war we have no censorship, as each of the belligerents must have. Each of the warring nations gets only such statements about the war as its own censors think it wise for the public to have. We get everything that the wires are allowed to take from every country in Europe, and Amsterdam and Rome send us every day more or less useful means of checking up the statements of the combatants. Our newspapers are the greediest in the world for news. In this upheaval of civilization, the only news that is sure to be read by everybody is that from the different war zones. The great rival newspapers are in the keenest competition to be known as purveyors of the most complete and accurate reports. Every day we read in them side by side the official statements of each of the contending nations, together with all the other evidence that can be collected by their regiments of European correspondents. The sources of these reports are carefully indicated—whether official, semi-official, the unsupported statements of such and such an individual, or mere rumours, the source of which cannot be traced. Each of the leading papers has a staff of so-called "military experts," i.e., retired graduates of West Point and Annapolis, our military and naval academies, who digest the official reports every day, and interpret the strategic meaning of the different situations as they develop. Maps drawn by them are published sometimes as often as every day. These digests and charts are syndicated to the smaller papers throughout the country. Of course, we are not informed of precise military details until they are ancient history, measured by our attentive interest; but the experience of two months proves that our information has kept us in the main accurately informed several days, and often

weeks, ahead of the general public in either of the countries directly involved.

To what extent this is true about the developments in the several countries among the civilians, we are in a less favourable condition to judge. The situation is such that we are evidently more in the dark about the civilians in Germany than in France or England. We had long since made up our minds, however, that we were mistaken in our primary theory as to the probable reaction in Germany. The Americans are extremely rare—I have been unable to find one in my own range of acquaintances—who believed that the governments would allow the spark which started the conflagration to kindle anything more general than a settlement between Austria and Servia. It was the well nigh invariable opinion here that the governments could not permit themselves to be drawn into the incredible folly of a general war. When we found that the unbelievable was actual, we declared that the great body of the German people certainly could not endorse a war which from our standpoint is the most damning indictment of European diplomacy that has ever been drawn. We were early convinced that we were again mistaken. We now know that the Germans are making one of the most wonderful exhibitions of national unity in the history of the world. We also admire the spirit of this unity while we believe the course of reasoning upon which it is based is one of the most deplorable mistakes in history. I will say more about that in a moment.

In the third place, because of what I have already said you may be able to see at once that two things are quite probable: first, that the lies which have been told about Germany have not had the influence in America which you suppose; secondly, that you do not sufficiently take into account the effect which lies told in Germany about the other nations have had upon the minds of Germans. As to the first, I think it is highly probable that the Americans are the most incredulous people in the world. "That which is written" has notorious potency to palsy the judgment, and Americans are no exceptions to the rule. On the other hand, Americans are omnivorous newspaper readers, and one of the few mitigating circumstances connected with this fact is that it results in a gratifying case under the law "familiarity breeds contempt." We have an unlimited capacity to swallow sensational reports, but we have a corresponding scepticism about their value. In the first days of consternation that war was possible at all, the only reports we could get came from Belgian and French and English sources, and were, of course, of the most lurid character. They had the effect of increasing the general horror and indignation. After there had been time for second thought, and after we had heard substantially the same stories about each of the armies, that whole phase of the situation lost its hold upon our interest. We not only doubt that one army is more guilty than another of unnecessary brutality, but we decline to be excited about the by-products of war so long as the essential barbarity of war itself is unrestrained.

As to the other matter, I may not be able to convince you, but I state the facts as we see them. The German people will some time discover that at least one lie has been in circulation in Germany

about the other peoples of the world for every lie that has been invented elsewhere about the Germans. As we Americans see it, one of the antecedents which have made this war possible, and which have made the Germans regard it as a holy war, is a whole fictitious psychology of the other peoples. A single illustration on which I can give testimony will indicate what I mean. Shortly after your letter reached me I received a paper from Berlin, on the first page of which, under prominent headlines, was an account of an alleged disturbance on the Canadian border, with indications that the United States would presently take possession of Canada! One would hardly suppose that a Berlin editor could imagine that there is a single individual in Berlin stupid enough to regard such a report as worth the ink which it took to print it. There is less probability that such an idea could be taken seriously on either side of the Canadian border than that Saxony at this moment should fear an incursion from Prussia: yet a whole mythology of this sort has misinterpreted the rest of the world to Germany. I do not mean to assert that all Germans have been uncritical about these fables. All that I urge is that it would be extremely hazardous for the Germans to assume that they have clear white light about the other nations, while the other nations are befogged about the Germans. It is perfectly evident, for instance, that the Germans have taken for granted many things that are wide of the facts about the relations of the British colonies to the mother country, and that these misconceptions have had not a little weight in calculations of the probable fortunes of war.

Then I want to testify about the American judgment as to the antecedents of the war. In a word, we have debated in private and in public, in newspapers and magazines, on the lecture platform and in the pulpit, the merits of the cases as presented by the warring nations each for itself. We shall doubtless make these claims the texts for much more discussion till long after peace is concluded. But our first reaction has been ratified by the general consensus of our accumulating conviction, viz., "a plague o' both your houses." Our general judgment is that if the controversy were settled beyond dispute, it would merely save the face of one chancellory or another as to the matter of skill in diplomatic manoeuvres. That whole question looks to us unspeakably paltry in comparison with the underlying fact. The essential thing, as we see it, is that all Europe is living on a militaristic basis, and is sacrificing the interests of the citizens as human beings to an arbitrary monster of "military necessity." The report has reached us within a few days that a delegation of German professors will be sent to this country after Christmas to lecture on the German side of the war. They will be welcomed almost everywhere, and audiences will listen to them and applaud them. But so far as changing any one's opinion is concerned, they would do Germany much more good by staying at home than by bringing to us amplifications of the type of argument by which German scholars have thus far tried to support the German programme.

We do not believe the political morality of Germany is either higher or lower than that of England or France. We are not very much deceived about the essence of the Belgian incident. We

know perfectly well that if the objective and subjective conditions had been turned about, and if England or France or for that matter the United States had been in the place of Germany in the closing days of last July, either of the three would in all probability have done just what Germany did in Belgium. Not being directly concerned in the complication, however, we can see that in fact it was an appalling confession of the essential barbarism of a militaristic civilization. To Americans this is not a war of Germans against Slavs, nor of Germans against England. In its ultimate causes and effects we believe it will turn out to be *a war against war*.

Americans are judging the Germans to-day not on the ground of anything that anybody else has said about them, but on the basis of their own declarations about themselves. Nobody knows better than the Germans that they have nowhere more startlingly exemplified their racial superiority of *thoroughness* than in their preparedness for war and in their theories about war. The German literature of militarism from Treitschke—not to go back further—to Bernhardi has not been hid in a corner. In this country we have been reading it, particularly for the last dozen years, but we have regarded it as what Herbert Spencer would call the "professional bias" of the officers. Very few of us have believed, even in our most imaginative moments, that the German people could ever be manœuvred into a position in which as one man they would regard it as the only moral alternative to endorse that militaristic philosophy. In this country all but a feeble minority regard the militaristic conception as a betrayal of reason and an appeal to chaos as the ultimate cosmic principle.

Kühnemann's address that I referred to above filled two hours, and was the most passionate declamation that I have ever heard. He announced as his subject "German Militarism." It turned out to be one of the most curious webs of fallacy that I have ever met. He never once in the two hours so much as hinted at "militarism" in the sense which every one in this country attaches to that term. He assumed throughout that "militarism" has no other meaning than the "German people armed for defence of the Fatherland," and he wasted his breath defending the right of the Germans to train themselves for military duty. To Americans that sort of thing proves either stupidity or evasion. We mean by "militarism" the creed that war is the foremost means of national self-realisation, and that the "interests of the state" justify the making of war by a stronger nation upon a weaker. Americans do not want any nation of Europe to gain a foot of the territory of any other nation without the free consent both of the nation and of the occupants of the possible cession. They do not believe that there is any difference worth speaking of between the European nations in their willingness to make the most of their military or naval strength in pursuit of the militaristic ideal. They know what is open to all the world, that *Germany has done more than all the rest of the world put together in the way of elaborating and publishing this militaristic ideal*. They do not want Germany humbled, but *they do want this hideous cult so discredited that no nation in Europe will profess it after this war is done*.

When I began this reply I had no intention of letting it run to this length, and what I have said amounts only to the introduction to what I wanted to say; but I must stop. Let me assure you that Americans hate the idea of aggressive might so genuinely that they will have no sympathy with vindictive might, however the war results. So far as I can judge of our whole people by the indexes which I can use, we hope the war will result in an absolute stalemate. We should be delighted if every bit of military and naval equipment of all the nations were to be wiped out of existence to-morrow, without the loss of another life, and if the cabinets should then be forced by the respective peoples to do what was their duty in the first place—join in a candid and rational adjustment of a *modus vivendi*. Our most influential men are talking seriously of proposing to Europe at the close of the war a system of international police composed of quotas of troops from all the nations, representing an international tribunal, and proceeding against any nation which refuses to abide by the findings of the tribunal. Possibly we are so far removed from the fumes of the battlefield that this, which Europe would regard as a diseased dream now, may turn out to be a forward look into the clear air of a better day.

Sincerely,

ALBION W. SMALL.

## Obituary.

THE HON. G. K. GOKHALE, C.I.E.

THE late Mr. Gokhale was for a short time a member of the Sociological Society. Statesman and patriot, teacher and saint, he stood for the highest type of Indian—a very high type indeed. He was a Chitpavan Brahman, born in the Mahratta town of Kolhapur in 1866, and from early manhood he deliberately and finally consecrated his life to the service of India. His *guru* was the renowned economist and jurist, the late Mr. Justice Ranadé, to whom his debt was admittedly very great. He graduated at Bombay at eighteen and soon after attached himself, characteristically, to the Fergusson College, a purely Indian institution. He remained on the professional staff for twenty years at a monthly salary of £5. From the outset he gave himself lavishly to the public service: as editor, secretary, agent, collector of funds—in every capacity energetic and efficient. In 1900 (this was soon after his first visit to England, on the Welby Commission) he was elected to the Bombay Legislative Council, and two years later to the Viceroy's Council. Here his brilliant natural abilities and his remarkable mastery of facts made him Lord Curzon's powerful and merciless opponent. His Budget speech became the event of the session, and to his constructive criticisms practically all subsequent reforms can be referred. His political mission to this country in 1905 first brought him, and to some extent the condition of India, into general public notice. He never recovered from the grave overstrain of this year. In June he had founded at Poona the Servants of India Society, a lay brotherhood for the training of young Indians in the service of the Motherland. Nothing else that he has done more clearly reflects his ideals: nothing was nearer to his heart. Nor can one omit to mention his services to the Indian National Congress, over which he presided in Benares at Christmas of the same year. Great significance must attach to his visit to England in 1908 when the Morley-Minto reforms were under consideration. His work on the Public Services Commission brought him here again in 1912, 1913, and 1914, and he had expected to sign the finished report this year. His arduous campaign in South Africa in 1912 on behalf of the resident Indians did much to bring about the satisfactory solution of a difficult problem. For the last four or five years of his life he laboured, as it seemed to him, in vain to obtain free compulsory education for his countrymen. That a man of his ability and statesmanship was never given a share in the government of his own country must remain an ironic commentary on our management of Indian affairs. He died in Poona, the old Mahratta capital, on February 19. His death has withdrawn a spiritual force from Indian public life.

K. M. R.

SIR OWEN ROBERTS, M.A., D.C.L., LL.D., F.S.A.

By the death of Sir Owen Roberts, which occurred on January 6th, the Sociological Society has lost one of its most distinguished members, who will always be remembered as one of the pioneers of technical education in this country. He was born in Carnarvonshire in 1835, and he spent the greater part of his active life in the service of the Clothworkers' Company, first as clerk and afterwards as master. His sphere of usefulness and activity covered a much wider area than the confines of the City of London, for it was due to his exertions that the clothworking and dyeing industries

of Yorkshire and the West of England were revived upon a scientific basis through the foundation of special Chairs, buildings for this purpose being founded in Yorkshire College at Leeds and in the University College of Bristol; and greatly through his influence these colleges were raised to university rank. He had great sympathy with women's work, and was one of the promoters of Somerville College, Oxford. It was publicly acknowledged by a deputation from the Incorporated Association of Headmistresses that the name of Sir Owen Roberts was foremost in regard to the benefits conferred upon schools and colleges for girls. He was a warm supporter of the London School of Economics, and was one of the prime movers in the foundation of the City and Guilds of London Institute, acting as its honorary secretary from 1876 to 1888; and for eleven years he served on the Technical Education Board of the London County Council. From 1891 to 1902 he acted as the Chairman of the Polytechnics Committee, while for the same period he served as Chairman of the London Polytechnic Council. He was for many years a member of the Senate of the University of London, and he was a member of the Royal Commission for the reconstruction of this University on a teaching basis. He was a man of the shrewdest judgment, and he possessed a wonderful capacity for estimating the value of other men's work and for getting the best results out of it. His business instincts and financial capacity were altogether exceptional. For twenty-five years he was Treasurer of the Society of Arts and afterwards the Chairman of the Council. He also served as Treasurer of the Society of Antiquaries. He was one of His Majesty's Lieutenants for the City of London and a Deputy Lieutenant for the counties of London and Carnarvonshire, of the latter of which he was the High Sheriff in 1908; and he was a Justice of the Peace for the counties of London, Surrey, and Carnarvonshire. He was knighted in 1888 for his work in connection with technical education. He leaves a widow and two daughters.

R. A.-J.

M. RAOUL GUERIN DE LA GRASSERIE.

M. RAOUL GUERIN DE LA GRASSERIE, who was for many years a judge in the civil courts of Rennes and Nantes, died on September 12th last at the age of seventy-five. He retired some years ago in order to devote himself to poetry, general literature, psychology, sociology and languages; and in every one of these departments he excelled the specialists who had devoted a lifetime to them. The bibliography of his works which Messrs. Melle Goussard and Co. have published is itself a volume; and the matter is arranged under no fewer than nine headings. The last section is, perhaps, the most wonderful, for it contains references to as many as fifteen translations from and grammars and dictionaries of the languages of Central America which this remarkable scholar had mastered. But it is for his writings on general sociology, economics, ethics, criminology, political science and comparative religion that sociologists will always remember and be grateful to him. To students of religion as part of the social order his *Cosmo-sociologie* is invaluable; and for the modern-spirited lawyers who wish to substitute a positive for a prohibitive system of laws his *De la justice en France et à l'étranger* is a veritable scripture. His *Essai d'une sociologie globale et synthétique* has a philosophic grandeur which only a Frenchman, and among Frenchmen only M. Raoul de la Grasserie, could have achieved; and if his life-work had consisted in writing that book alone he would have been a man of distinction. He was a corresponding member of the Sociological Society.

M. E. R.

## REVIEWS.

## SOCIAL UNDERCURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY. Vol. xiv (New Series).  
 London: Williams and Norgate. 1914, pp. 438. 10/6 net.

THE latest volume of the PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY contains the thirteen papers read before the society during its thirty-fifth session, 1913-14. The topics discussed represent nearly every department of philosophy—logic, ethics, psychology, epistemology, ontology. The authors include some of the most eminent of living British philosophers. Their views are representative of every leading school of thought—idealist, realist, and pragmatist. To the general public the names and teachings of some of our most original thinkers are wholly unknown; they have seldom published papers and have never written books. We must, therefore, be peculiarly grateful to a society which prints contributions not only from such well-known writers as Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, but also from great thinkers who seldom write like Professor J. A. Smith. None of the articles deals directly with sociological problems. Yet each has an interest for the sociologist; either because it discusses assumptions that happen to underlie all sociological study, or because of the concrete, practical, and therefore social tendencies which, in common with most recent philosophical work, it exhibits.

The first paper to which the sociologist will naturally turn is that dealing with *The Treatment of History by Philosophers*. A prose narrative of past events, literary in form, moral in aim—such was history as conceived by the early historian. To the modern historian it is something more. It has become rather a descriptive and retrospective form of sociological research. The truly scientific character of recent historical work has profoundly modified the philosophical significance of history. This Dr. Morrison's paper does not perhaps sufficiently emphasize. But his discussion clearly demonstrates how history (mainly, we venture to think, in virtue of its sociological character) raises the most fundamental problems of philosophy. Can the growth and destiny of societies be adequately explained by the mechanical principles which seem to have sufficed for the processes of inanimate nature? May not the world as a whole have a purpose, related in some way to human purposes? Were the human wills, which worked these purposes, free wills, or was their freedom illusory? Is time, the medium through which history has manifested itself, real, or but the illusory appearance of a timeless reality? Are the human consciousnesses, which form the agents or the victims of social progress and decline, real and permanent, or are persons but stages in the development of an impersonal Absolute, or a vast inanimate automaton? And what, finally, is the significance of feeling? These are the questions which, as Dr. Morrison shows, are raised by history for philosophy to solve. Some of the philosophers' solutions, however, would scarcely satisfy historians. To Dr. Bosanquet, for example, history is "a hybrid form of experience incapable of any considerable degree of being or trueness." "The doubtful story of successive events cannot amalgamate with the complete interpretation of

the social mind, of art, or of religion." Nor does such a view satisfy Dr. Morrison. He himself inclines rather towards the attitude of Lotze and of Ward; though for the clearest formulation of certain problems he turns rather to M. Bergson and Mr. Bertrand Russell.

A detailed consideration of many of the issues thus raised we may find in other papers in the same volume. Professor Alexander, for instance, deals with the problem of *Freedom*. His paper is a valuable continuation of the series in which he has expounded his own original and suggestive system of philosophy. Freedom is defined as "enjoyed" determination. Save "enjoyment," it involves no feature which distinguishes it from natural or physical action, which is "contemplated." But beings on a higher level of existence—for instance, God or the angels—"contemplate" actions which we "enjoy"; hence, actions which for us are free, for them are determined and natural. Professor Alexander does not tell us whether the historian or sociologist occupies the position of an angel or of a god.

Miss Shields maintains *The Notion of a Common Good*, and applies it, in a section which is all too brief, to practical social problems: the opposition between Capital and Labour, the Home Rule crisis, and the incompatible interests of conflicting nations. Two men are in love with the same woman; one is refused, the other accepted. Was the woman's choice "good" for all three? A hundred candidates apply for a post; one is successful, the rest fail. Is the appointment "good" for the ninety-nine? Philosophically, Miss Shields maintains that the choice, if good for one, is good for all. If there be such a concept as good, then it must be recognisable as such by all rational individuals. The *opinions* of different individuals as to what is good may conflict; their *interests*, falsely identified with their good, may genuinely clash; but their good itself, never. Nevertheless the realization of good in one form limits or hinders possible good in another form. If one individual eats a piece of the cake, neither he nor anyone else can continue to have it. Hence, all the possibilities of human nature cannot be realized in every man; nor can all the inherent capacities of one individual find adequate scope or fulfilment. Endowments and opportunities alike are limited. But this only implies that the amount of good actually realizable at a given moment is a finite quantity. It does not prevent that good being common. Indeed, it is the very community of that good which demands that society make the most of the peculiar contributions of every individual: and if any one person's apparent good cannot show itself to be common—if A's education involves B's starvation, or if C's life involves probable death for D and E—then we are justified in challenging the value of that apparent good.

Miss Shields' thesis is thus a criticism of atomistic individualism. At bottom the question resolves itself into psychology. The gap separating my consciousness from your consciousness is (as she points out) not so utterly impassable as it appears. Selves are not absolutely impervious or impenetrable. At times they interpenetrate. This may be verified by falling in love. And the fact thus corroborated may be generalized. "Suppose," Professor Nettleship has suggested, "that all human beings felt permanently and universally toward each other as they now do occasionally to those they love best." Then, so far as individuality means mutual exclusion, there would be no individuals. Consciousness would be common. And good for one would be good for all.

To apply Miss Shields' principles to the Home Rule problem or the European War may seem strained. Such crises show us rather how

far from clear and complete is the communal consciousness even of the most civilized nation: and how conspicuously undeveloped is the common consciousness of the civilized world. The distinctness of personal centres of consciousness is the rule; their coalescence the exception. Hence, for practical purposes, Miss Shields' philosophical criterion remains but a formal and negative one. The common good constitutes, not the presupposition of ethical and social endeavour, but rather its goal.

A converse problem in personality is raised by Dr. Mackenzie's paper on *The Psychology of Dissociated Personality*. Moralists and metaphysicians may discuss how minds attached to different bodies may fuse in a common consciousness: the medical man discovers that within one and the same body there may at times appear a number of different minds. As yet, however, the philosophical questions involved have scarcely been formulated, much less resolved.

The social psychologist has come to recognize the immense importance in practical life of feeling. The philosopher has seemed rather to ignore it. In a valuable paper on *Feeling* Professor J. A. Smith concludes that the psychologist may be permitted to use the term as a heading; but denies that it can be the name of a philosophical conception or category. "Pain is real only as an element in a whole that is Pleasure; and if Pleasure is Feeling, Pain is non-Feeling within it, just as Feeling which is Pleasant or Painful, is ignorance within knowledge, and inactivity within activity."

Directly or indirectly the foregoing papers emphasize the psychical aspect. A similar emphasis upon the psychical is observable in Dr. Wildon Carr's treatment of Time. His paper on *The Principle of Relativity* is, to the layman, perhaps the most interesting and suggestive of all. As Dr. Shelton elsewhere in the volume has insisted, one of the most neglected functions of philosophy is the co-ordination of the ultimate results of science. With a courage and a knowledge rare even among contemporary philosophers, Dr. Carr starts from some of the latest and most technical experiments upon the transmission of light. Light, it is commonly supposed, is propagated in a medium called ether. The ether, it is inferred, must, in relation to the earth's movement, remain at rest. Hence, when measured by an observer stationed upon the earth, the apparent speed of light should prove to be faster or slower according as the observer is being carried to meet or carried away from it: just as the speed of a flying cricket-ball appears greater if one rushes up to it, but less if one drops the hand as it is caught. In the case of light the most careful experiments have been made. The result is negative. The velocity of light never varies in spite of the movements of the observer or even of its source. And it has proved wholly impossible to discover the motion of a system, for instance the earth, relatively to other systems, for instance the sun or stars, by means of experiments performed wholly within the first system.

From this curious paradoxes follow. It has been calculated, for example, that were we to leave the earth in a system of translation moving at  $1/20,000$  the speed of light, remain absent two years, and then return, we should find the world had aged 200 years in our absence. To borrow Dr. Carr's illustration, suppose Gulliver, when shipwrecked on Lilliput, had himself shrunk during his sleep to Lilliputian dimensions, then, on waking, he could not have discovered that everything around him, and himself as well, were one-twelfth their normal size. Suppose, further, that after twelve Lilliputian years he returned to his former world, unconsciously restored in transit to his original proportions. He would still be unaware that things were twelve times as large, years twelve times as long, as in Lilliput.

But, whereas he would have lived through twelve years, he would find that his former world would have lived through but one. According to the Relativists, a change in our physical conditions, precisely of this kind, is taking place at every moment. Their generalization may be formulated as follows: "Neither space, nor time, nor matter, nor ether (if there be ether) is absolute: none of these is one and the same reality for every observer: each is particular to the observer."

Dr. Carr accepts this inference from the experimental results; and shows that it raises three philosophical problems, to which he suggests three philosophical and indeed Bergsonian answers. The first is Sir Oliver Lodge's problem of continuity. The notion of physical continuity seems to have broken down. Hence it appears it is our psychical continuity alone that makes experience uniform. Similarly, all physical movement seems to be relative. Hence, the only absolute or original movement is to be sought in "the reality we know as life or consciousness." Thirdly, if, as perception itself indicates, "pure duration" is a quality and not a quantity, we shall be able to rationalize the empirical principle of the relativity of time and space. Thus the latest conclusions of physics seem to imply the latest doctrines of philosophy. We may, however, hesitate to accept the original inferences of the physicists. The experiments themselves are at present few in number. And alternative explanations are still possible. The velocity of light itself appears to change in passing through different media: it travels more slowly in water than in air. Yet, under certain conditions, for instance, the measurement of the aberration caused by the movement of the earth, the influence of the medium cannot be traced. It is, therefore, possible that the apparent constancy of the velocity obtains only under special conditions.

The tendency toward psychological and even social criteria may be traced in papers whose topics at first sight least suggest it. It may be traced, for instance, in the lively controversy between Dr. Wolf and Dr. Schiller upon the value of logic—or rather upon the value of Dr. Schiller's latest book, *Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem*. It may even be traced in the discussion between Mr. G. E. Moore and Professor G. F. Stout upon the status of sense-data. Of all the contributions of the session the results of this symposium are perhaps philosophically the most important. The relation of our sensations to our minds on the one hand and to things on the other forms a problem whose interest for the sociologist is but remote. But it must interest him to find how far both philosopher and psychologist have progressed towards an essential agreement, not only with each other, but also with the uncritical and unexpressed views of society in general.

CYRIL BURT.

#### NATIONALISM AND ETHICAL RELIGION.

THE SOUL OF AMERICA: A CONSTRUCTIVE ESSAY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION. By Stanton Coit. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914, 8/6 net.

THIS book by Dr. Coit, long one of the leaders of the Ethical Movement, should be welcomed by all who believe that religion is an essential factor in the solution of the social problem and who are interested in securing a religion adapted to the requirements of modern life and in harmony with modern science. Its frank disavowal of all supernaturalism will repel many,

while its use of traditional theological terms in new senses may offend others; nevertheless, a careful reading of the book will convince any unbiassed student of modern religion, despite its radical defects, of its great constructive value. Unfortunately, also, the book is wrongly named. Its chief title seems to imply that it is a study of the inner life of the American people. Its subsidiary title, however, more accurately describes its content. While specifically addressed to the American people its principles are universal; and with slight changes it might as well have been addressed to any other people. The work is really an attempt at a humanistic interpretation of Christianity, using the principle of nationality as the basis of such interpretation.

In Part I. Dr. Coit attempts to identify religion with the higher patriotism. "Religion and patriotism," he says, "are one and the same thing whenever the religion is sound and the patriotism is high." God is "the moral genius of a people." Each people should, therefore, worship its own God, the Redeeming Power, the Spirit of Social Service, among themselves. Naturally Dr. Coit finds many of his chief arguments for such a nationalistic religion in the history of the Jews. Applying the principles practically, he would make America the living church to which all Americans should belong, and the moral genius of America the God of their personal and social redemption. To many this will seem the least satisfactory part of Dr. Coit's book. To identify religion with "the higher patriotism," no matter how high it may be, would seem to undo much of the work of the Christian centuries in religious development. For practically it would be difficult to distinguish between the higher patriotism and national egoism, as the present European war abundantly illustrates. Hyper-nationalism is one of the rotten stones in the foundations of Western civilisation which should be removed as soon as possible. Unless a higher spiritual unity than the nation can be developed by our civilisation for the love and service of men, there can certainly be no assurance that the present terrific struggle among nations will not be repeated. For it is not true, as Dr. Coit asserts, that nations are to humanity what individuals are to the nation. This is the organismic theory of the state carried to its logical extreme—a theory which now is discredited by the best sociological thought. Humanity, not the nation, must be the unit of our ethical and sociological thinking, though a subsidiary loyalty to one's national group strengthens rather than lessens one's loyalty to humanity as a whole—a fact which cosmopolitans have sometimes overlooked.

It is in Part II., on the re-interpretation of Christianity in the light of science, in which we find the really valuable constructive elements of the book. While Dr. Coit rejects entirely traditional Christian theology, and indeed all theology in the ordinary sense of the term, yet, like Comte, he accepts Christian ethics. He sees clearly that the real struggle of the present is not over Christian theology but over Christian ethics; and he throws his whole weight on the side of a purified Christian ethics. "Christianity," he tells us, "as soon as it has become transfused with the spirit and transformed by the method of modern science, will bring about the millennium." "Christianity plus science" is, in a word, his formula for the solution of the social problem.

This section of the book abounds in so many constructive suggestions with reference to modern religious problems that we cannot do justice to it. For illustration, Dr. Coit would not ask present religious denominations to give up their creeds, but to unite in one co-operative body for humanistic and patriotic service. He would substitute, in other words, for our present

doctrine of religious toleration a doctrine of religious co-operation, present sects becoming simply parties in one national (why not universal?) church. But even here Dr. Coit seems to the writer of this notice to make one fatal blunder; and that is, his negative attitude towards the supernatural or superhuman element in the present religion. He would, apparently, absolutely exclude the recognition of this element from organised public religious practices, though inconsistently he speaks approvingly of Emerson's pantheism. Inconsistently, too, it seems to the reviewer, he recognises man as a spiritual being, while refusing to recognise God as universal spirit. Philosophically there is the same reason for demanding continuity on the spiritual side of the universe as there is for demanding continuity on the physical side. Moreover, man is so made that practically he cannot believe the best about humanity without believing the best about the universe; he must believe in the essential beneficence of the great forces of nature if he is to believe in the beneficence of human nature and society. Religion demands, therefore, belief in the ascendancy and triumph of the spiritual element in the universe as well as in human society. Nor is this opposed to the scientific spirit; for the faith in the one case is as reasonable as the faith in the other.

One final criticism must be passed upon Dr. Coit's book, and that is that it contains no sufficient recognition of the extent to which it is based on Comte's "Religion of Humanity." Dr. Coit's religion, like Comte's, is a humanistic Positivism. Like Comte, he would reject Christian theology, while retaining Christian ethics and many Christian ecclesiastical forms. Any reader of Comte's later writings could not but see the close resemblances between their ideas and Dr. Coit's. Why should he, then, fail to give due credit to Comte as the source of many of his ideas? Can it be that he supposes that the same prejudice exists in America against Comte and Positivism as there seems to exist in England?

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

#### ROGER BACON.

THE LIFE AND WORK OF ROGER BACON. By John Henry Bridges, M.B., F.R.C.P. Edited, with additional Notes and Tables, by H. Gordon Jones, F.I.C., F.C.S. Williams and Norgate. 3s. net.

THIS work by Dr. Bridges, one of the founders of the Sociological Society, was originally published as an introduction to his edition of the *Opus Majus*. It now appears in a more accessible form. The subject was one eminently suited to its author's historical powers and wide sympathies, for Bacon was at once schoolman and man of science, a devoted Catholic and a precursor of modern thought. Bridges had the capacity of understanding the ideals of every age, and not least of Bacon's time, when the foremost minds could still hope to strengthen and uphold the Church by extending the field of scientific knowledge. The attitude of Roger Bacon to the old and the new, to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, to Catholic morality, to alchemy, to the nascent sciences of physics and chemistry, as here set forth, is a most fascinating study. What is perhaps most singular is not merely Bacon's anticipation of modern scientific method, but his superiority in this respect to many investigators who came much later, including his illustrious namesake, Francis; for Roger not only recognised to the full the importance of experiment, but the validity of deduction. Dr. Bridges writes:—

His protests against the intellectual prejudices of his time, his forecasts of an age of industry and invention, the prominence given to experiment, alike as the test of received opinion and the guide to new fields of discovery, render comparison with his great namesake of the sixteenth century unavoidable. Yet the resemblance is perhaps less striking than the contrast. Between the fiery Franciscan, doubly pledged by science and by religion to a life of poverty, impatient of prejudice, intolerant of dullness, reckless of personal fame or advancement, and the wise man of the world richly endowed with every literary gift, hampered in his philosophical achievements by a throng of dubious ambitions, there is but little in common. In wealth of words, in brilliancy of imagination, Francis Bacon is immeasurably superior. But Roger Bacon had the sounder estimate and the firmer grasp of that combination of deductive with inductive method which marks the scientific discoverer.

The editor has appended some valuable notes derived from other writings of Dr. Bridges, including an account of Robert Grosseteste, the great bishop, and of the Mohammedan schools of learning. To Dr. Bridges's Introduction the sculptor of the fine statue of Bacon at Oxford attributes a large part of his inspiration. Assuredly, this is the best estimate of Roger Bacon and his work in a compendious form.

S. H. S.

#### JAPAN YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY.

LA SOCIÉTÉ JAPONAISE. Etude Sociologique par Teruaki Kobayashi, Chargé de cours de sociologie à la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université Impériale de Tokio. Traduit du Japonais par M. Junkichi Yoshida avec le concours de Mme. Laudénbach, sous le contrôle de l'auteur. Paris : Librairie Felix Alcan, 1914.

PROFESSOR KOBAYASHI, in this work, ably summarises the theories of Comte and many lesser writers on sociology. Subsequently he treats of the influence upon civilization, progress and national characteristics of climate, topography, vegetation, etc.; but only in a general way, without mentioning any peculiar or distinctive qualities of the Japanese in this connection, so that the reader misses what should be the whole point of the chapter. Likewise, after an exposition of the value of the statistical method in gauging the social factors of any given race or nation, he truly remarks that to be of any scientific use these comparisons of percentages must be based on a quite reliable census of the total population. He then explains in detail how and why the Japanese census returns up to the time of writing have been far from accurate, and, this being the case, refrains from making any detailed statistical comparisons or analysis. Again, the reader seems to have missed the point and wonders why so much space was devoted to a purely negative statement.

In narrowing down his discourse to the actual qualities of the Japanese people the professor says: "The study of our country, of our people and our society to-day tempts a good number of Europeans, but they meet with obstacles at every step; to only mention one, the extreme difficulty of collecting materials." It is misleading to speak of the extreme difficulty of their enterprise without taking note of the vast quantity of material now made available to them in English. A very extensive knowledge of Japanese history, laws, government, religion, etiquette, family life, literature, poetry,

art and industries can be acquired, even without a knowledge of the Japanese language, through the many careful translations of original documents by Englishmen and Americans, many of them masters of style; while articles from the Japanese daily press and the public utterances of politicians and others are available in translation in the local English press in Japan within a day or two of their appearance. Is it not also rather misleading to speak of the unique unbroken line of the Imperial family without explaining the much used expedient of adopting a successor to the throne from a collateral branch?

On page 42 the author says that "Japanese civilization constituted itself in a world apart from that of Europe, India and China." He immediately qualifies this with a quotation from M. Revon to the opposite effect. On the next page he says: "In 285 certain classical books (it should be "a book") entitled *Rongo* were presented to the court by one of the ancient nations of Korea." This is an unduly brief reference to the introduction not only of the celebrated sayings of Confucius, styled by Dr. Legge "The Confucian Analects," but of the art of writing itself into Japan. The influence of the first ideas which the Japanese Court had ever encountered in literary form may well be imagined. The worship of ancestors and the paternal theory of the relationship between the ruler of a country and his subjects, which our author treats as distinctive features of the primitive state of his country, in reality were imported from China in the Confucian classics, other volumes of which were introduced later. Buddhism, from India by way of China and Korea, was introduced in 552. "The brilliant ideas of China and the profound ideas of India then spread and penetrated and their mingling took place in the current of Japanese ideas which made them its own while preserving and even accentuating the characteristics peculiar to itself. In 1853," continues the author, "an event of the utmost importance came to modify the life of this peaceful Eden, the unexpected arrival of the American ships." The suggestion that Japan between the years 552 and 1853 can in any way be compared to a peaceful Eden is indeed strange. The early contests between the introducers of Buddhism and the partizans of the older form of worship were carried out in a far from gentle manner, though fortunately on a small scale. Besides the wars for the subjugation of the Ainu and Kumaso tribes, which we find duly mentioned, there were struggles for power innumerable between the most powerful clans in the country. The history of the country is largely a record of continual internecine fighting until the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the Tokugawa house of Shoguns began and an armed peace was established which lasted with only minor interruptions until after Commodore Perry's visit.

The author also omits to state that on the mental and spiritual plane there were changes and controversies, due to fresh contacts with outside ideas. Such were the rise of numerous and varied Buddhist sects, consequent on the study of particular books in the vast literature of the Buddhist scriptures by different learned monks, some of whom, like Kobo Daishi, spent years of study in China. The introduction, spread, and violent suppression of the Roman Catholic faith taught by the Spanish Jesuits deserves a mention, if only as the starting point of the rigidly anti-foreign policy which characterised the Japanese Government in Commodore Perry's time and which it was his task to overcome. Then there was the devotion of the learned advisers of the governing class to the philosophy of Wang-yang-ming and of the Sung schoolmen, Chinese writers who cast their metaphysical speculations on Nature and Man into the form of commentaries

on Confucius. Then we have the controversies between these and the party who aimed at a return to pure Confucianism, and of the latter with the new school (about the end of the 18th century) in favour of the "revival of Pure Shinto" so-called.

It is from the writers of the last-named school that superficial students of Japanese religion have derived the impression that the religious ideas prevailing at the present day are of Shinto origin. The movement called the "Revival of Pure Shinto" was really a process of bringing the primitive system up to date by patriotically attributing to it a great part of the Confucian morality and some Buddhist practices that had become so widespread as to appear universal and spontaneous. Filial piety and ancestor worship were given especial prominence in the revival. Lastly, not a few of the most inquiring minds had gained inklings of Western science through surreptitious contact with the Dutch at Deshima, risking imprisonment and even the death penalty in their zeal for the forbidden knowledge. These things formed the mental inheritance of the generation which added to them European culture and American methods, and a just estimate of their influence is necessary in order to understand the Japan of to-day; but Professor Kobayashi ignores all these and seeks an explanation of the qualities of modern Japanese society in the prehistoric age, in the prophecy of the sun-goddess and under the reign of her divine grandson, who is, everywhere outside certain circles in Japan, notably the Imperial University, believed to be about as historical as Deucalion.

In the few details given us of the state of things during the historic period, there are some curious mistakes. In the enumeration of the classes into which the population was divided before the Meiji period (the reign of the last Emperor) the merchants are placed before the farmers, an important transposition, as it conceals the fact that the Japanese, like the ancient Greeks, esteemed the traders below the farmers and artisans. This latter class, which ranked next above the merchants, the professor omits entirely from his list, though its works represent one of Japan's chief titles to fame among the nations of the world.

The whole volume throws singularly little light on the subject with which it professes to deal, and the reason may perhaps be found by altering one word in the criticism of Professor Takebé on the sociologists of another country: "The *German* savants are very peculiar in this respect, that they do not hesitate to sacrifice science to national policy" (page 46). The duty of accepting the official version of the origin and history of the reigning dynasty renders historical research and unbiassed thinking impossible for the holders of posts at the Imperial University of Tokio. Therefore the present generation of thinkers in Japan should not be all judged by the calibre of the writer of this work.

LILIAN HALL.

#### HENRI POINCARÉ ON METHOD.

SCIENCE AND METHOD. By Henri Poincaré. Translated by Francis Maitland; with a preface by the Hon. Bertrand Russell, F.R.S. Nelson. 6/- net.

THE brilliant genius of the late Henri Poincaré embraced a wide range of scientific thought, and a work of his on the subject of method cannot fail to be of interest to the sociologist as well as to the mathematician or the physicist, to whom it is more immediately addressed. The present volume is not a systematic treatise, but a collection of essays, grouped in an orderly

fashion, dealing with the methods of science in general and with some special applications. The author begins with a discussion of the principles on which we select facts for investigation, remarking incidentally that "sociology is the science with the greatest number of methods and the least results." This is said to be due to the complexity of the elements, which are human beings, and to the fact that, as history does not repeat itself, the historian is denied the privilege enjoyed by workers in other sciences of selecting for first study those phenomena which are most often repeated, and which are therefore most likely to disclose the underlying law. A protest might be made from the sociological side, but it is interesting to observe the impression made on so philosophical a mind as that of Poincaré by recent writings on sociology.

An autobiographical essay on the conditions of mathematical discovery, in which much use is made of the hypothesis of the subliminal self, and a chapter on mathematical definitions in education, are of special interest to psychologists. The theory of chance, a subject dealt with by Mr. Balfour in his recent Gifford lectures, is also discussed in relation to the discovery of scientific laws. The chapter on the relativity of space is very suggestive. Probably few of all those who admit in general terms the relativity of knowledge realise all that that doctrine implies, and physicists received a severe shock some few years ago on being shown the consequences of pressing home the doctrine in the domain of optics. The controversies that arose from that revelation are not yet closed, but their history contains important lessons for sociologists. The same lesson of the importance of the purely relative standpoint is emphasised by later chapters on the new mechanics, and on the influence of the discovery of radium on physics.

The author diverges slightly from his main path in order to discuss the attempts to reduce mathematics to a branch of logic. Here he is thoroughly at home, and his criticisms of the attempts of the logicians to define "one" and "zero" without any appeal to intuition, whether they carry conviction to the minds of experts or not, are at all events most entertaining reading. Nothing that Poincaré wrote is dull, and it is impossible to read these essays, comparatively slight though they are, without receiving illumination on many questions of scientific method.

C. H. DESCH.

#### TAXATION AND SOCIAL ORGANISATION.

ENGLISH TAXATION A.D. 1640—1799. By William Kennedy. G. Bell, 7/6 net.

THIS is a valuable study in an obscure region. Mr. Kennedy's aim has been to seek out not only the kind of taxes which English rulers have imposed, but also, and mainly, the ideas, economic and social, which moved them to select these particular taxes. He does not offer a criticism of these ideas; he expounds them. Incidentally he achieves two other results—he lets us see how political changes reflected themselves in financial policy, and he offers reasons for modifying the view that even so great a man as Adam Smith was as revolutionary and as redeemed from the past as is commonly assumed.

The Civil War marked a turning point, largely as a result of necessity, in English financial practice and thought. For some 300 years before that the budget was, in theory at least, sectional. The main source of supply was the royal domains. The customs, on both imports and exports, were

justified as tolls for the maintenance of the navy, although in practice they would be applied to ordinary expenditure. No question of distribution could arise properly, although the habit was to spare necessities; and trade policy played some part in determining the nature of the customs dues. Direct taxes, the aids and subsidies, were thought of as occasional emergency taxes only, from which the poor were exempted.

The costly wars from the Civil War to the treaty of Utrecht modified these ideas. Direct taxes became a regular part of the revenue. Customs were no longer looked upon as intended peculiarly for the service of the navy. In point of fact many duties were mortgaged for the payment of the interest on debt, and this had the result of perpetuating many indirect taxes, and giving much rigidity to the financial system of the 18th century. Customs—which were levied mostly on luxuries—came to be regarded as the ideal tax, because it was assumed that the consumption of such articles was a good measure of means. They combined (so it was believed) the virtues of social policy because they fell on luxuries, of trade policy because they protected, and of equity because they were distributed according to capacity. Export duties were practically abolished.

The Long Parliament and its successors made numerous attempts at an improved direct tax. Mr. Kennedy is probably right in thinking that the aim was to make income the standard; but the failure, confessed in the stereotyped land tax of 1692, was complete. It was not till Pitt that the effective machinery for an income tax was worked out. It should be noted that between the Revolution and 1692 the century-old practice of exempting the poor from direct taxation was dropped, to be resumed, however, in the 18th century. One of the financial novelties of this revolutionary period was the excise, levied mostly on necessities, and commended to the financier because easily raised and drawing upon the poor as upon other classes. But the excise was always unpopular. It was charged with being inquisitorial and therefore dangerous to liberty as well as oppressive to the poor.

Mr. Kennedy has some interesting things to say about the political philosophy of the 18th century, and its reflection in finance. The 16th century conceived society as composed of so many castes, each with its function to perform and enjoying property in virtue of that function. The contractual theory of Locke treated society as an association of individuals, enjoying property in their own right and demanding of society the protection of that property. It was the "freeholder" as opposed to the "functional" view of society. The earlier doctrine rather tended to the exemption of the poor from taxation; the later tended to subject him to it. The 18th century was always trying to reconcile its notion that all, as freeholders in the state, should pay, with the coarse reality that a great many were "freeholders" in theory only and in fact bitterly poor.

The 18th century had not the notion of compensatory taxes. It could not think of a budget just as a whole, although the constituent taxes might each bear with unequal weight. Each tax had to be equitable in itself. Add the theory that taxes on the poor were shifted on to employers by an increase in wages, and you have two of the leading financial ideas of the 18th century. Add again the prejudice against "inquisitorial" direct taxation (*i.e.*, income tax), and it will be seen that opinion was directed to taxes on commodities other than necessities as the ideal tax. Apart from his views on trade policy Adam Smith showed the prejudices of his time. He opposed the income tax. He assumed, along with his contemporaries, that the consumption of certain articles is a fairly faithful index of income.

And he did not take the compensatory view of taxation. Some phrases of his lent the authority of his name to the easy device of taxes on necessities. It is not unjust to conclude, therefore, that for a time at least his influence was for rather than against the taxation of the poor.

H. SACHER.

#### DR. HADLEY'S LECTURES.

**SOME INFLUENCES IN MODERN PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT.** By Arthur Twining Hadley, President of Yale University. Oxford University Press, 1913. Pp. 146. 4/6 net.

THIS is an age of specialisation and it becomes increasingly difficult for the scientist, the philosopher, the historian, the sociologist to survey other fields than his own. The John Calvin MacNair lectures were instituted for the purpose of showing the inter-relations of science and theology so as to break down the barriers between them, and this book is a reprint of the course given by President Hadley in 1912. The protest against specialisation is marked at the outset: "He who is content to be a specialist and nothing more, however long and well he may have been trained, cannot properly be said to have been educated." Everyone must have a philosophy, but each must win it for himself by actual contact with life and by study of the classics of literature, history and science, which will show him "which things have proved large at all times instead of simply looking large for the moment." The purpose of these lectures, therefore, is to indicate the main lines of thought in science, politics, and literature that have successively influenced men in the nineteenth century and to point to the causes that have produced one after another positive, evolutionary and pragmatist philosophies. Such a wide survey of the facts is necessary to enable us to understand why at the end of the nineteenth century men were seeking a different sort of explanation of the universe from that which had seemed satisfactory at the beginning. The subject is treated from the sociological rather than from the psychological standpoint, and an appendix on "The Influence of Charles Darwin on Historical and Political Science" is of especial interest to the sociologist. President Hadley points out how far-reaching is the effect of the Darwinian method upon political ideals. Here, as in biology, survival has been made the test of right. This, the author holds, is the main contribution of Darwin to political science, and it is an extremely important one for it involves a revolution in conception and method. A novel parallel is drawn between the philosophy of Darwin and that of Gamaliel—as given in the fifth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles—in that for both "the criterion which shows whether a thing is right or wrong is its permanence." In this also, we are told, lies the meaning and the force of Pragmatism, and its bearing upon political science is that it emphasises the truth that "we are members one of another." The last lecture on "The Spiritual Basis of Recent Poetry" traces the changes wrought in men's conceptions of the universe by the need to find again man's place therein. An interesting but necessarily brief review is given of nineteenth century poetry, of the later phase of which Browning is said to be at once the most representative and the most significant for the twentieth century, since endurance, not submission, is the watchword of this generation. It is to be regretted that President Hadley has published these lectures as they were given, for they suffer from too great

compression and would probably have gained considerably by expansion. Brief as they are, however, they serve a useful purpose in reminding us of the need for a wide outlook and of the dangers of undue specialisation.

L. S. STEBBING.

**WOMEN UNDER POLYGAMY.** By W. M. Gallichan. London: Holden and Hardingham, 1914. 16/- net.

POLYGAMY is one of those institutions which it is difficult for the Western mind to consider without prejudice. The author of *Chapters on Human Love* has now given us an impartial statement of the case, chiefly from the women's point of view. It is a statement that was needed, and a very interesting book Mr. Gallichan has made of it, though, as he would himself admit, it is only a sketch of a huge subject. He gives many personal documents from Oriental acquaintances, and thus the book is no mere arm-chair lucubration. "What," asked James Hinton, "is the meaning of maintaining monogamy? Do you call English life monogamous?" It is curious to find, as Mr. Gallichan shows, how much legalised polygamy there was in England until the 18th century. The author would call this "polygamy," but there seems to be little use in perpetuating so merely legal a distinction.

Economic reasons are chiefly assigned for the origin of the institution, working together with a certain masculine instinct for variety of mates. More important for practical politics are the estimates of the effect of the institution upon the character and development of women. European feminists should study these. Dr. Coomaraswamy says: "The power of women over men is far greater in India than in any industrial state in the West." Every polygamous country can show that the married women, and all are married, fulfil with some completeness their conjugal and parental possibilities. A Hindu in London remarked: "Probably you think, like most Englishmen, that polygamy is an evil." He stretched his hand towards the vista of countless houses. "In this suburb alone you have several thousand marriageable single women in excess of men. Is that an evil, or not? In India we cannot understand this anomaly. At the same time, you have a vast degraded class of women in your White Slave traffic."

Western ideas about feminism are beginning to penetrate Eastern social thought. But, though the East may modify its relation to women, sane though it is, it is hardly likely that the West will adopt any Eastern modifications of its system. There are here certain racial differences, which have not yet been analysed, but which seem to be concerned with the fundamental attitude towards questions of sex. In the West this attitude is reserved; in the East it is frank. The respective results are the same in practice, but not in law and opinion; consequently the Western method abuses womanhood, while offering it a superficial freedom.

A. E. C.

**THE LAWYER: OUR OLD MAN OF THE SEA.** By William Durrant. With a Foreword by Sir Robert E. Fulton, LL.D. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1913. 7/6.

LAW, we know, is "the science of human relations." In so wide a field one must expect some weeds. Mr. Durrant has found many, and, indeed, he protests that there is nothing else to find in all the law. He cites every

instance of miscarriage of justice, or hardship, which he has found in newspapers or books, new or old, every hard saying concerning lawyers gleaned from wide reading. He surveys England, India, and the United States, and everywhere finds all things legal bad. There is none good from the Lord Chancellor to the solicitors. The solicitors get off lightly with one short chapter, but the bar is the parent of all evils. Advocates intentionally mislead juries; juries are incompetent; criminals escape, or are acquitted on technical grounds; law reporters are careless; the common law is bad and the principal asset of the bar; unprincipled judges alter the common law; barristers settle their clients' cases against their instructions; they also spend long years in thwarting justice and continue their nefarious career as judges. All lawyers are tainted with mediævalism, legalism, Byzantinism. The law's treatment of illegitimate children and spendthrifts, of marriage and divorce, for which lawyers have no more responsibility than other citizens, is set down to their account.

The advocates whom Mr. Durrant despises would have taught him to make his attack more effective by selecting his strong points and discarding his weak ones. Mr. Durrant makes all seem weak alike. His remedies for the evils of the legal world are these: fusion of the two branches, shortening of the Long Vacation, codification of the law. These are familiar faces, grown a little old-fashioned. He would abolish the freedom of testamentary disposition; he would do away with juries, at least in civil cases, and especially he would have no barrister made a judge. A special class should be trained for judges, as on the Continent; and he would have many more judges and pay them much less. Some day a philosopher may extract from the long series of complaints against lawyers—once so much more common than now—the essence of the evil which the world suspects to lie in association with the law. It has eluded Mr. Durrant. Meanwhile the world perversely exalts the lawyers of whom it complains to positions more and more responsible in the government of the realm.

E.B.V.C.

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THE LAW AND THE POOR. By His Honour Judge Edward Abbott Parry. Smith, Elder and Co, 1914. 7s. 6d. net.

JUDGE PARRY displays that entire freedom from professionalism which the expert achieves only when he has mastered his subject completely. His book is essentially sociological. Every chapter of it shows how people's actions and opinions are conditioned by the social environment. In commenting, for instance, on the notion that a judge ought to be unbiassed, the author points out that "he is just as much the product of the age as one of yourselves. He has toddled about in the same nursery, learned in the same school, played at the same university and lived in the same society as the rest of the middle classes. Why should you expect in him a super-instinct towards futurist sociology?" On another page he writes: "We arrive in the world knowing nothing much about it, we are brought up to believe that everything that has been going on for the last few centuries has been for the best, and the tired old ones who are leaving us are never tired enough to leave off telling us that they have made every possible reform that it was safe and advisable to make. In the few years of hustling life and in the scanty hours that he can spare from earning his daily bread the average citizen has little time and opportunity to investigate the social system of which he is a unit, or to understand how or why the wheels of

the world machine are grinding unevenly." The leading idea that the book sets forth is that men's thoughts are cramped into systems which make the reform of social abuses as slow as geological changes. The writer may well emphasise that conviction when such monstrous evils as imprisonment for debt and the bankruptcy laws are still in existence; but it prevents him from appreciating the achievements of reformers. For instance, he has nothing hopeful to say about the "Rules of the Supreme Court (Poor Persons) 1914"; and in complaining that the brewer and the puritan between them have robbed the poor of pleasant places for harmless refreshment and recreation, he makes no mention of the restaurants which have been founded by such bodies as the People's Refreshment House Association and the Central Public House Trust Association. But he is by no means over critical; and he has made some simple and excellent suggestions for the righting of the wrongs of which he complains that all sociologists ought to study carefully. From that process they will derive a good deal of enjoyment, for the book contains as much comedy as tragedy.

M. E. R.

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**LIFE AND HUMAN NATURE.** By Sir Bampfylde Fuller, K.C.S.I., C.I.E. Murray, 9/- net.

THE failure of the Germans to systematise human nature ought to make this work particularly acceptable to a large public at the present time. It is everything that a German treatise on biology and psychology could not be, for it is full of well-arranged facts, but these are narrated with so much wit and humour that the book is charming as well as informative. The author divides the impulses which actuate living creatures into eight classes, of which four—the individualistic, social, reproductive and provident—represent essential activities; while four—kindness-and-cruelty, the æsthetic and ethical inclinations, directive instinct, and reason—represent the inessential activities. It is in his treatment of the tendencies that he ranges in pairs that the interest of the book centres, for it shows that if psychologists are to be true to life they must proceed as if they were writing a drama or painting a picture rather than making diagrams or giving lectures. The kindest of men sometimes commit acts of gross cruelty, and whether they will be cruel or kind on any given occasion depends upon the race to which they belong and the training which they have received, but cannot infallibly be predicted from one's knowledge of these. The æsthetic instincts give rise to self-abandonment, the ethical to self-restraint; and these two sets of instincts sometimes work in harmony but anon are at war with one another in one and the same person. Reason, Sir Bampfylde Fuller describes, as an impulse to link one's experiences in a next-to-next formation and make inferences from one link to another. His comments on the mistakes, both ludicrous and pathetic, that this process entails, form some of the most entertaining pages in the book. His judgments are distinguished throughout by shrewdness tempered with charity; but they are warped a little sometimes by an over-estimation of the power of money. These characteristics are concentrated in the closing chapter, which deals with human nature in governmental affairs and contains some suggestions for making parliamentary work positive and constructive, while yet maintaining the criticism of measures and men which is the redeeming feature of party politics.

M. E. R.

**EPOCHS OF CIVILIZATION.** By Pramatha Nath Bose, B.Sc. Calcutta : W. Newman & Co.

Mr. BOSE propounds a theory that the stability of civilisation depends upon a balance of animalism with rationalism and benevolence. He pictures all races and nations as passing through the different stages of development that these words indicate. Beginning with the year 5000 B.C. and closing with the present day, he divides history into three epochs, and shows how various peoples have advanced from an appreciation of material standards of culture to intellectualism and altruism, and then, like China and India, have attained an unprogressive equilibrium, or, like Greece and Rome, have perished. His first era, from about 5000 B.C. to about 2000 B.C., embraces the civilizations of Egypt, Babylonia and China; the second, from about 2000 B.C. to about 700 A.D., comprises those of India, Greece, Rome, Assyria, Phœnicia and Persia; and the third includes those of the Saracens and of the various nations of Europe. In spite of this rather crude way of arranging his thoughts, Mr. Bose has made a notable contribution to the literature of sociology in writing this book; and what he has learnt by studying Indian quietism is precisely the lesson that the present war ought to be driving home in the minds of Europeans—that national glory depends upon moral superiority no less than upon material achievements and intellectual acumen.

M. E. R.

**ESSAYS AND STUDIES PRESENTED TO WILLIAM RIDGEWAY.** Edited by E. C. Quiggin, M.A., Ph.D. Cambridge University Press. 25/- net.

THE many friends of Professor Ridgeway combined to celebrate his sixtieth birthday by the presentation of a volume of essays dealing with topics on which their own special studies impinged on those of the professor. The result is an extraordinary accumulation of curious learning, which the editor has been able to classify into twenty-five essays in classics and ancient archæology, seven in mediæval literature and history, and sixteen in anthropology. The character of the essays is as various as the subjects; we have, for example, brief treatments of broad issues, as "The Contact of Peoples," by W. H. R. Rivers, and "The Settlement of Great Britain in the Prehistoric Age," by W. Boyd Dawkins, passing by gradations to monographs on particular gems or inscriptions. The essay most likely to attract general attention is a very characteristic one by Sir James Frazer on "The Serpent and the Tree of Life," an extremely ingenious speculation on the original meaning of the legend, supported by a wide collection of serpent and lizard myths on the subject of death and immortality.

G. S.

**MINDS IN DISTRESS.** By A. E. Bridger. Methuen, 2/6 net.

"MINDS in Distress" is an illuminating and well-chosen title for a book; but one is a little prejudiced against the author by the title of another of his works, "Dyspepsia Perfect and Imperfect," which suggests a not very clear understanding of the use of words. The examination of the new book confirms that suspicion. The author maintains that there are two chief elements in the human mind, one the reasoning or male factor, and the other the instinctive or female factor; and that sanity consists in a healthy proportion of the former in the man's mind and of the latter in the woman's mind. If the word "reasoning" were abandoned and a more comprehensive word used; if "instinctive," which nearly all authors to-day use very loosely, were given up and a word wider than Laycock's "affectability" chosen, there

might be something to be said for the theory; but the writer nowhere defines the terms that he employs, and therefore the book is valueless from the scientific point of view, although it contains some arresting sentences that are worth consideration.

J. L. T.

THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE GREEKS. By E. E. Sikes, M.A. David Nutt. 5/- net.

THIS is a useful book, summarising and setting out in clear form the line of inquiry that has been pursued by a number of Greek scholars, including its author, in recent years. It was not so long ago that classical scholarship and anthropology were poles apart. This little book (like the composite volume on *Anthropology and the Classics*, published some years ago) reveals the benefit that has accrued to both studies from their mutual influence. Of its five chapters those on the problem of race and on the city-state will probably be of most interest to the general reader. We have not done with these Greek problems yet. The old Greek antithesis between the "cultured" Hellene and the outer "barbarian" has been revived among German thinkers as a claim to domination; and the old controversy between Spartan militarism and Athenian amateurishness is being re-awakened in the struggle between Prussianized Germany and the State which Treitsche delighted to call Venice-Carthage. Mr. Sikes's book was written before these issues became acute, but to read it now is to remind oneself how all roads in political and social thought go back to Greece.

A. E. Z.

EARTH HUNGER AND OTHER ESSAYS. By William Graham Sumner. Yale University Press, 1913. 10/- net.

IN the remote and dark period of the early seventies Mr. Sumner was elected Professor of Political and Social Science at Yale. During the many years in which he held this post he appears to have excited the admiration of some of the students who passed through his hands, and who have done him the very doubtful service of collecting and republishing a number of his productions which had not previously been printed or which had been published in obscure, scattered, or inaccessible places. Professor Sumner's work does not favourably impress the British reader. It is full of confident generalisations unsupported by either evidence or argument. Here, for example, are two sentences from an essay entitled, with unconscious humour, "The Scientific Attitude of Mind": "There is never any correct process by which we can realize an ideal. The fashion of forming ideals corrupts the mind and injures character." "In the Middle Ages all men pursued phantasms . . . people had no idea of reality."

G. S.

## PERIODICAL LITERATURE IN WAR-TIME.

## AMERICAN, ENGLISH, AND INDIAN.

A CONSIDERABLE amount of periodical literature has appeared since the outbreak of the war, but the earlier publications were either written before the commencement of hostilities or were merely characteristic of the sudden change; and it is only comparatively recently that we have had any quantity of serious literature written and published under the altered environment created by the present conflict. At first it seemed probable that all serious writing would be postponed indefinitely and that we should have to depend on the daily papers for a criticism of current events. Such prophecies, however, have proved false; and although the contents of many of the current periodicals may be found unsatisfying the publications have appeared, and as far as quantity is concerned they seem to have preserved their normal standard.

At a time when even those most intimately concerned in the struggle consider and emphasise the ideals for which they are fighting, it would have been a calamity if the publication of the more serious journals had received any considerable check. Yet, although the periodicals have been published, it is disappointing to find many of the articles full of the most shallow rhetoric and a general failure to realize the grave responsibility which rests on thinkers, as thinkers, and not merely as mouthpieces, of the martial spirit. It is only occasionally, as in the symposium *What is Americanism?* in *THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY*, that the true ring of sound philosophic thought is heard, and there survives some appreciation of the ideas for which the world both in peace and war is really struggling. The excuse that we are fighting, and therefore as a nation should cease to think, loses most of its significance in a war of long duration and it is probable that a similar English symposium of our own ideals, followed by a similar synthesis, would perform no mean service in strengthening and consolidating our appreciation of the ends for which we are struggling.

The only periodicals which can be compared to *THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY* for clearness of view and soundness of judgment are those concerned with economics. Originally one of the most abstract of social studies and one of the most questionable when applied to humanity, political economy seems to have far outstripped many of the less abstract sciences in its grasp of the realities of life. Mr. Liefmann, in an article on *Monopoly and Competition* in the February *JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS*, develops very suggestively the fact that monopoly is the result rather than the antithesis of competition, a truth vitally important in many spheres of social science. In contrast to such sound psychological arguments we find Mr. Chambers in the January *EUGENICS REVIEW* repeating the old saying that "to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of peace," without giving a thought to the fact that the instrument made by man reacts on the maker and demands to be used. Eugenists, who from the nature of their studies should be the most human of scientists, seem doomed to tread the same path as the older economists, and only after laborious courses of abstract reasoning come into real contact with the varying hopes and fears of our existence.

In the February OPEN COURT, a journal usually conspicuous for its calm and well-balanced thought, the editor, like Mr. Chambers, seems oblivious of the fact that man desires to use the machine he makes, and in dealing with a kindred subject seems equally unconscious of the fact that men and women have always been proud and glad to send those dear to them to the perils of war. To search for "the real and ultimate motive" of the present struggle may at its best be a somewhat complicated and perhaps futile task, but to start the search without a full grasp of human nature in all its various aspects must inevitably result in grotesque distortions of individual and social influences. No amount of detail of past treaties and subsequent violations, of perjured words and dum-dum bullets, will carry conviction if the writer does not feel in his heart and honestly describe the true stuff of which human nature consists.

A similarly narrow and one-sided view of individual and social psychology is to be found in the two recent issues of THE ROUND TABLE. Such sentences in the December number as "the beliefs and sentiments traditional in peace have no relevance in the supreme emergency of war," and "the sole question before us is how to win the war," seem to be an exact paraphrase of the Bernhardt principles which we usually condemn. It is not made quite clear whether at the outbreak of war we are to assume entirely new morals, beliefs, and national characteristics, hastily manufactured by the Government, or whether we are to fight without any beliefs or aspirations at all. In the first proposal we have the identification of God with the State so closely associated with modern German thought, while in the second we have a philosophy which teaches us, when our humanity is most needed, to descend to something lower than the beast. Among the practical suggestions contained in the same leading article we need only mention the idea that conscription suddenly imposed on England would turn the populace into an obedient and mindless machine, and that "if compulsion is adopted the War Office can get men as it needs them without publishing the state of affairs."

The curious philosophy outlined in December is continued in the March number of the same periodical. The conception of two worlds, one of peace and one of war, is combined with the idea of a temporary logic of war, and there follows an exhortation to carry out a measure necessary to victory whether we believe it or not. The dubious ethical value of such arguments is entirely ignored; but the culminating paradoxes are reached in such self-contradictory expressions as "private politics" and in the third article where a sentence advocating force as a means for instilling an ideal is followed in the very next line by an account of "the inevitable tragedy of a victory of force." Possibly the writer considers that in war time self-contradictory phrases contain substantial truths, but those who believe in the value of consecutive thought will find a great deal that is difficult to grasp. An article on *Nietzsche and the Culture State* is less inconsistent, and the difference between the fundamental principles of Nietzschean philosophy and our present conception of German ideals is clearly shown.

From the chaos of contradictions, evolved from an attempt to combine the essence of Bernhardt's philosophy with our old English ideals, it is refreshing to read the carefully selected articles in the current HINDUSTAN REVIEW. Dr. Dillon's excellent introduction to *Just for a Scrap of Paper* is reprinted from "The Daily Telegraph War Books," with his suggestive comparison of the Pope's and the Kaiser's claims to divine revelation in the present conflict; and Mr. N. Gupta's article on *The Message of Hinduism*

should be read in conjunction with the curious forms of European ethics already mentioned. Miss E. M. White in her remarks on *Bergson and Education* suggests that the world, dissatisfied in turn with the guidance of authority and logical reason, will adopt some such idea of life as Monsieur Bergson expounds. It must, however, be remembered that compared to Eastern thought Monsieur Bergson shows himself a true Westerner when he says that harmony is rather behind us than before. The contrast between the Eastern idea of losing individuality and the Western idea of finding it is also evident in Mr. Pramatha Nath Bose's article on *Will Western Civilization Survive?* His suggestion that, if Western thought takes as long as Hinduism to pass through the material and intellectual stage, we cannot expect any higher ethical standards before the close of the present century, should be qualified by Mr. Horniman's opinion, quoted by Professor Rawlinson, that there are few who "appreciate to the full the extent to which English society and English institutions and everything in England benefit by the connection with India."

It has been said that Christianity must contain some great truth or it would never have survived the harm done by its exponents, and if we take the general tone of the present periodicals as specimens of the serious thought of the last few months, the same might well be said of patriotism; only occasionally and often in quite unexpected places does one find any but the most ephemeral and shallow of patriotic sentiments. But there may emerge from the present conflict a patriotism which helps to fulfil other needs besides those of the recruiting sergeant, a patriotism perhaps a little less confident, perhaps realizing more the claims of something higher than nationality, yet resting on a surer and more lasting foundation. What it loses in sweeping and showy statements it may find in a reality which will be respected in all ages and appreciated alike in the councils of the learned and in the meetings of the market-place. Its simplicity, however, must be a sign of profundity and not of shallowness; and in such a patriotism there can be no great change on the outbreak of a war, no divorce of thought and action either in war-time or peace-time. During periods of war it must preserve much of the calm, clear judgment of peaceful thought, and in times of peace retain some of the enthusiasm and unselfishness of war: in storm and calm it must rest on the same foundations, too surely tested to be injured by the jest of any idle cynic. Let us hope that by the love of home and country such patriotism will satisfy a feeling deeply rooted in the Western mind, while by a wider love of humanity it will transcend all shallow nationalism and absorb what is finest and most lasting in the philosophy of the East.

C. B. ANDREWS.

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#### FRENCH.

AMONG the French and Belgian journals of sociology that the war has, for the time being, swept away, there is none that sociologists will miss so much as the *BULLETIN DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE SOLVAY*. The staff of the Institute has, of course, been dispersed; and from M. Varendonck, who is now in this country, we learn that M. Waxweiler is engaged in lecturing, on behalf of Belgium, in Switzerland. With the help of Queen Elizabeth, in the early days of the war, he turned a number of hotels and villas in the neighbourhood of Ostend into hospitals; and when he was driven into exile

he wrote a book entitled, *La Belgique neutre et loyale*, which is being published at Lausanne by Messrs. Pargot and Co. There he gives a scientific analysis of the documents by means of which the Germans have sought to incriminate the Belgians; and the evidence he brings forward is such that no German in the future will be able to gainsay it.

Our readers will regret to hear that LE MUSÉE SOCIAL has also vanished for the time being, likewise L'ACTION NATIONALE and LA REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE; but happily LA SCIENCE SOCIALE and LA REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE have appeared as usual. In spite of the important public duties which he has undertaken, M. René Worms has found the time and the courage to put as much matter as ever into the *International Review*, and he has maintained the philosophic tone of the journal admirably. The January number contains an article which ought to be useful to the Law Group of the Sociological Society. It consists of a chapter on *Les sciences et la méthode reconstructives* from Professor Antonio Dellepiane's book of that title. By the reconstructive sciences the professor means those, like geology, palæobotany, and history, which have to be built up by the imagination from vestiges of the objects of study which form the heritage of the present from the past. He works out his theory from the principles which constitute the validity of legal proof, and argues that the magistrate in order to be efficient must have a philosophic as well as a legal training. The lawyer must be able to reconstruct the past from the facts belonging to the present which are brought before him in the court. A mere knowledge of the law will not enable him to appreciate them, and to give its just value to every element of the evidence and put all the elements together into a scientific judgment. It is hardly clear, however, that the judge would learn this method of appraising and synthetising facts from the study of geology, or even of history, as well as from that of philosophy. M. Dellepiane seems to think that he would. The truth appears to be that all sciences are reconstructive in the sense that they are founded on common, everyday knowledge of what is happening in the present, but that they include a large number of facts which are beyond the range of observation and experiment and which must, therefore, be taken on faith, or rather reconstructed. One does not necessarily acquire a philosophic habit of mind, however, from the study of any science. The fact is that the lawyer's education is defective from both the philosophic and the scientific viewpoint. In order to fix the data he collects into an appropriate framework he needs to have a philosophic outlook, and also to possess the sociological information which would enable him to judge the past from the present instead of always examining the present in the light of the past.

The rest of the article space in the January number is occupied by half of a long paper by the late M. Raoul de la Grasserie on *The Effects, both Beneficent and Harmful, of the Idea of Religious Salvation*. He establishes the truth which most modern students of religion seem to be arriving at—that the aim of religion is the achievement of happiness, and that only so far as that object is attained do men desire life on earth and survival after death. He gives many examples of the extraordinary ways in which devotees defeat the object of their religion by inflicting penances on themselves, manufacturing ritual sins, and forcing salvation on the members of their own communions while they neglect Jews, atheists and other outsiders; and shows how men seek to secure their own safety by these practices. With the solicitude of religious people for the welfare of others the subsequent paper will deal.

The report of the proceedings of the Paris Sociological Society shows that only two of the sittings have been abandoned on account of the war. At the opening of the session in January it was decided that the subject which has been on the programme since November, 1913, should be retained, but that instead of following up the discussion on economic, political and religious liberalism with debates on philosophic, moral, educational and artistic liberalism, according to the original plan, the members should reconcile their scientific with their nationalist interests by devoting their attention to "libéralisme et autoritarisme," and compare German ideas of liberty and government with French ones.

LA SCIENCE SOCIALE for January and February is a study, by M. Ernest Picard, of the class organisation of the French nation in the sixteenth century, and is entitled *Les ancêtres de Pantagruel*. The introduction contains an appreciation of M. Philippe Champault, who died on December 21st, and of MM. Adelphe and Laffitte, who perished on the field of battle; and a lecture on the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente which M. Léon Poincard delivered in Paris in the spring of 1914. He speaks of the bond between Germany and Austria as a device for promoting ambition rather than friendship; and of the compact between Russia, France and England as hardly a contrivance at all, but as a natural measure of protection of three countries, whose interests are essentially pacific. To the question—Will the understanding between the three allies be permanent?—he answers: . . . the very firm stability of England will be the determining factor in the maintenance of the agreement. The sense of responsibility which the British acquire from the discipline both of their homes and of public life favours continuity of policy to such an extent, that the disruptive tendencies of government in France and the revolutionary ideas to which the break-up of the mir system is giving rise in Russia may have no power to break the alliance. On the other hand, if the prestige of Prussia were destroyed, the motley populations which constitute the German Empire might find that their affinities were not strong enough to hold them together.

M. E. R.

## PROCEEDINGS OF SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

On Tuesday afternoon, February 9, Mrs. Mabel Palmer lectured on "Permanent Peace Policy: a Critique," the Rev. Dr. Walsh presiding. (Professor Herbertson, who had been announced to read a paper on "Some Sociological Geographical Problems of the War," was unable to do so on account of illness.)

On Tuesday, March 9, at 8-15, Mr S. H. Swinny read a paper on "An Historic Interpretation of the War," Mr. J. M. Robertson, M.P., in the chair. The paper appears in the present issue.

On Tuesday, March 23, at 5-15, Sir Thomas Barclay read the paper on "The Hague Tribunal: its Constitution and Potentialities," which appears in this issue. Dr. Thomas Baty was in the chair.

### SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY GROUP.

On Tuesday, January 12, at 5-15 p.m., Dr. Beatrice Edgell read a paper on "The Foundations of Character."

On Tuesday, February 2, at 5-15 p.m., Mr. C. B. Andrews opened a discussion on "The Danger of the English Adoption of German Methods." (Miss Ida Sachs being prevented by illness from reading her paper on "The Analysis of Character.")

On Tuesday, March 2, at 5-15 p.m., Mr. Cyril Burt lectured on "Psychological Tests and Vocational Guidance."

Further meetings have been arranged as follows:—

Tuesday, May 4, at 5-15 p.m. Mr. E. A. H. Jay: "The Juvenile Department of the Labour Exchanges and the Choice of a Vocation."

Tuesday, June 8, at 5-15 p.m. Dr. Murray Leslie: "Nerve Strain and War Conditions."

Tuesday, June 22, at 5-15 p.m. Mr. A. F. Shand: "Demonstration of Methods of Studying Character."

### INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION COMMITTEE.

On Monday, January 25, Mr. Aneurin Williams, M.P., read a paper on "A League of Peace."

On Monday, February 8, Mrs. Palmer spoke on "The Bankruptcy of Pacifism."

On Monday, February 22, Mr. Brailsford read a paper on "International Organization and Economic Rivalries."

On Monday, March 8, Mr. R. C. K. Ensor read a paper on "Foreign Policy and Party Politics."

On Monday, March 22, Dr. W. R. Bisschop lectured on "The Possible Extension of International Functions."

Further meetings have been arranged as follows:—

Monday, May 3 (not April 26 as originally arranged), at 5 p.m. Dr. W. R. Bisschop: "The Constitution of the Hague Court."

Monday, May 31, at 5 p.m. The Rev. T. J. Lawrence, LL.D.: "The Concert of Europe."

The meetings of the Groups are held in the Rooms of the Sociological Society, 21, Buckingham Street, Strand, W.C.